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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff-Appellee does not dispute this Court's jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court correctly concluded that defendants waived their 
contractual right to arbitration by actively participating in litigation for over two years, to 
a point inconsistent with intent to arbitrate, resulting in prejudice to plaintiff if arbitration 
is compelled. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in defendants' Motion to Compel 
Arbitration, which was denied by the district court. (R. 677, 777; Add. 1.) 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Central Florida Inv., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc, 
2002 UT 3,^10, 40 P.3d 599. 
2. Whether defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a contractual 
right to arbitrate after actively participating in this litigation for over two years, and 
compelling arbitration would injure plaintiff. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by plaintiffs counsel at the 
hearing on defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1162, Tr. 88-89.) While 
estoppel was not relied upon by the district court, this Court may affirm the district court 
ruling "on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 
UT 61,^18, 29 P.3d 1225. 
Standard of Review: "The application of the facts to the legal standard of 
equitable estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law." Trolley Square Assocs. v. 
Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994). However, courts give "considerable 
deference to [the district court's] findings and judgment" on questions of equity. Angelos 
v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 776 (Utah 1983). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-131 (2002) states that "an arbitration agreement made 
before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the arbitration act in force on the date the 
agreement was signed." (Add. 57.) The agreement at issue in this case was signed 
February 6, 1998. (R. 14.) Therefore, the agreement is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3 la-3 (2002), the statute in effect on February 6, 1998. That section states: "A 
written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, 
enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside 
the agreement or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." (Emp. add.) (Add. 55.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action concerns a dispute over a distributor agreement (the "Agreement") 
whereby Defendants-Appellants Britesmile Management, Inc. ("Defendants") appointed 
Plaintiff-Appellee Smile Inc. Asia ("Plaintiff) as their exclusive agent for the sales, use 
and distribution of their equipment, reagents, and laser-aided teeth-whitening products in 
Southeast Asia. (R. 3.) The Agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring the 
parties to submit any dispute involving the Agreement to arbitration. (Agreement, 
\ 14(d), R. 20.) This appeal concerns the enforceability of the arbitration clause. 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on April 23, 2002, alleging breach 
of contract and fraud claims stemming from Defendants' failure to honor the Agreement. 
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(R. 1.) The parties proceeded to litigate the dispute for over two years. Among other 
things, Defendants filed two dispositive motions (R. 39, 124), engaged in extensive 
discovery (R. 76, 74, 80, 367, 690-91, 693, 1165), participated in oral arguments before 
the court (R. 94, 229; Add. 10), and obtained rulings and orders from the court. (R. 345, 
375; Add. 10,30,36,47-53.) 
Before the court could rule on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery, 
Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation on May 24, 2004. 
(R. 677.) As Plaintiffs Motion to Compel production of sensitive financial information 
and other electronic documents was currently pending before the court, the timing of 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration suggested that Defendants were attempting to 
avoid compelled disclosure of this information. On June 28, 2004, the district court 
issued a written ruling denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (Add. 1.) 
The court held that Defendants had waived arbitration by actively litigating the case for 
two years, contrary to any intention to arbitrate, and that referring the case for arbitration 
at this juncture would prejudice Plaintiff. Defendants appeal the district court's denial of 
their Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1136.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pleadings and Motions to Dismiss 
On April 23, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging breach 
of contract, fraud, and other tort claims. (R. 1.) The lawsuit stemmed from a dispute 
over a distributor agreement the parties entered into on February 6, 1998. (Agreement, 
R. 14.) The Agreement contains an arbitration clause stating, in pertinent part, that the 
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parties "agree[d] to waive trial by jury or by judge and resolve any dispute arising 
between [them] with respect to matters set forth in [the Agreement] by arbitration^]" 
(Agreement, 114(d), R. 20.) 
Defendants filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
fraud and unjust enrichment claims. (R. 23-49.) In their Answer, Defendants asserted 
nineteen affirmative defenses. Defendants' eighteenth affirmative defense stated as 
follows: "This dispute is subject to mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to paragraph 
14(d) of the Agreement and as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3." (R. 34.) This is 
the only reference to arbitration in Defendants' Answer. 
In their Counterclaim, Defendants alleged breach of contract and breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 34-37.) Defendants' allegations contained 
detailed discussion and reference to some paragraphs of the Agreement, but Defendants 
nowhere mentioned the arbitration clause in their Counterclaim. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was accompanied by a seven-page memorandum, 
in which Defendants vigorously argued that the district court should dismiss Plaintiffs 
fraud claims for failure to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). (R. 46.) In addition, 
Defendants urged the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim on its 
merits, citing various cases and arguing that the claim fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Defendants nowhere mentioned arbitration in their Motion to 
Dismiss or accompanying memorandum. Defendants requested a hearing on their 
Motion to Dismiss. 
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Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants' Counterclaim (R. 50-54), and a memorandum 
in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 55-63). Defendants filed their Reply 
along with a Notice to Submit. (R. 55-73.) 
On September 4, 2002, pursuant to Defendants' request, the court held a hearing 
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Add. 10.) The court denied Defendants' Motion as 
to the unjust enrichment claim but granted Defendants' Motion as to the fraud claims. 
However, the court granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff 
timely filed an amended complaint (R. 95), and Defendants filed a second motion to 
dismiss, requesting oral argument (R. 121). Defendants' Motion was accompanied by a 
five-page memorandum, again arguing that Plaintiffs fraud claims should be dismissed 
for failure to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). (R. 124.) Defendants' Memorandum 
never mentioned arbitration. Plaintiff filed a memorandum opposing Plaintiffs Motion 
to Dismiss. (R. 130.) Defendants then filed a seven-page Reply Memorandum, which 
made no mention of arbitration. (R. 154.) 
On June 11, 2003, the court held a hearing on Defendants' second Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 229.) (The court also heard argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, 
which is discussed infra.) The court later entered a written ruling denying Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. (Add. 30.) There is no suggestion from the record that arbitration 
was mentioned at the hearing. 
Discovery Prior To Motion To Compel Arbitration 
Defendants actively participated in discovery for two years before filing their 
Motion to Compel Arbitration. (Add. 47-53.) From June 2002 to March 2004, the 
parties jointly filed a total of five scheduling orders with the court. (R. 85, 169, 216, 342, 
399, Add. 7, 11, 14,28,38.) 
In June 2002, counsel participated in an attorney planning meeting, submitted a 
report to the district court (R. 76-79), and filed the initial scheduling order with the court 
(Add. 7.) 
In July 2002, the parties exchanged their first requests for discovery. (R. 74, 80.) 
Defendants' discovery request consisted of thirty-five interrogatories and twenty-seven 
requests for production of documents. (R. 866-80.) 
In August 2002, Defendants served on Plaintiff their answers to Plaintiffs First 
Set of Requests for Admission, but did not respond to Plaintiffs Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. (R. 92.) 
In February 2003, Plaintiff served on Defendants thirty pages of information in 
response to Defendants' first set of discovery requests. (R. 881.) 
In April 2003, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, seeking to 
compel Defendants to properly respond to Plaintiffs first set of discovery requests, 
which were served on Defendants nine months earlier. (R. 177.) The exhibits attached to 
Plaintiffs motion contained portions of the extensive correspondence between the parties 
and detailed Defendants' continued failure to respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests. 
(R. 201.) According to the correspondence, Defendants never suggested that their failure 
to respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests was due to their desire to arbitrate. Plaintiff 
also sought their attorney fees incurred in preparing the Motion. (R. 211.) 
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On June 2, 2003, the court signed a minute entry noting Defendants' continued 
failure to properly respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests, but delayed signing 
Plaintiffs Proposed Order to Compel and for Sanctions in light of the evidence of the 
parties' continued communication regarding discovery. (R. 207, Add. 13.) The next day, 
Defendants filed Amended Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission. 
(R. 220.) On June 11, 2003, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. 
(R. 229.) (The court also heard argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, discussed 
supra) After hearing oral argument, the court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and 
ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiffs fees incurred in preparing its motion.1 Defendants 
then filed a five-page objection to Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. (R. 234.) The 
court eventually awarded Plaintiff its attorney fees in the amount of $1,330.00. (R. 324, 
Add. 16.) Later in June, Defendants finally responded in part to Plaintiffs year-old 
Interrogatories Requests for Production of Documents, but Defendants' responses were 
incomplete. (R. 245, 259.) 
In July 2003, the parties participated in a telephone conference with the court, 
initiated by Plaintiffs counsel, to address Defendants' continued failure to respond in full 
to Plaintiffs discovery requests and Defendants' representation that it was "physically 
unable" to provide the requested documents because it was in the midst of a warehouse 
move. (R. 362, Add. 33.) The court noted that Defendants' discovery responses were 
insufficient, but, pursuant to Defendants' representation regarding the move, the court 
1
 The court later entered a three-page written order denying Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. (Add. 30.) 
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granted Defendants additional time to produce the requested discovery. However, the 
court indicated a willingness to levy sanctions against Defendants if Plaintiff discovered 
that Defendaats' representations regarding the move were inaccurate. The court issued a 
three-page written order regarding the conference call. (Add. 33.) Soon afterward, the 
parties filed a ten-page Stipulation Governing the Disclosure of Confidential and 
Proprietary Information and accompanying order, which the court reviewed and signed. 
(R. 328, Add. 18.) 
In August 2003, Plaintiffs counsel traveled to Walnut Creek, California, and spent 
almost a full week at Defendants' office and document-storage facility, inspecting 
hundreds of boxes of documents. (R. 383, 479.) At that time, it became clear that 
Defendants' representations regarding an imminent warehouse move were entirely false. 
(R. 1162. Tr. 5-6.) Later in August, Defendants served on Plaintiff its Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, and its First Set of Requests 
for Admission. (R. 365, 1020.) The same day, Defendants sent Plaintiff a fifteen-page 
letter detailing reasons why Plaintiffs response to Defendants' first set of discovery 
requests was insufficient. (R. 915.) Defendants drafted and sent a similar letter two 
weeks later. (R. 1161.) Plaintiff responded to Defendants' allegations in a lengthy letter 
of its own. (R. 1161.) 
In September and October 2003, Plaintiff supplied Defendants with hundreds of 
pages of documents pursuant to Defendants' discovery requests, including responses to 
Defendants' First Set of Requests for Admissions (R. 367); supplemental responses 
comprising thirty-six pages of additional information (R. 1165); responses to Defendants' 
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Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, consisting of 
thirty-four pages of information (R. 1032); and supplemental responses, comprising 
seventy-one pages of information (R. 948). 
In February 2004, the parties filed a Joint Motion Regarding Plaintiffs Production 
of Documents and accompanying Order (R. 373), which the court reviewed and signed. 
(Add. 36.) Later that month, Defendants took four days of depositions of Plaintiff s 
principals, Tan Sek-Ho Earnest Rex and Grace Chong-Tan Mo-Ai (R. 743, 1079, 1088), 
who are residents of Singapore and traveled to the United States at their own expense. 
(R. 691.) Defendants also participated in the depositions of five other witnesses (R. 690-
92), including John Reed (R. 401), David Cox (R. 402), John Warner (R. 404, 454), 
Michael Williams (R. 595), and Jeffrey Jones (R. 598). 
In March 2004, Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order, seeking to protect 
digital copies of its accounting information. (R. 379.) The Motion was accompanied by 
a five-page memorandum and six exhibits. (R. 382.) The exhibits detailed the parties' 
lengthy correspondence and numerous telephone conversations regarding discovery 
issues. On March 10, 2004, the parties filed the final Case Scheduling Order, which was 
reviewed and signed by the court. (Add. 38.) The Order stated that factual discovery 
would be completed by August 31, 2004, expert discovery by December 31, 2004, and 
that the cutoff for dispositive motions was January 31, 2005. 
On March 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel production of electronic 
documents. (R. 492.) Plaintiffs Motion was accompanied by a twelve-page 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Compel and in Opposition to Defendants' 
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Motion for Protective Order. (R. 407.) Plaintiff attached nine exhibits detailing the 
extensive correspondence and other communications between counsel for the parties 
regarding discovery and related issues. (R. 423.) Plaintiff also included an affidavit from 
the Managing Director of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, averring as to Plaintiffs need 
for and the relevance of the electronic financial data it sought from Defendants. (R. 475.) 
On April 19, 2004, Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Protective Order and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. 
(R. 497.) Defendants' filing included twelve pages of legal argument with dozens of case 
citations, and thirteen exhibits to the Memorandum, totaling over eighty-one pages of 
material. (R. 513.) Again, the exhibits catalogued Defendants' participation in a litany 
of correspondence and telephone calls with Plaintiff regarding discovery. 
On May 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Reply in Support of Plaintiff s Motion to 
Compel and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. (R. 599.) Before 
the court could rule on the pending discovery motions, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Compel Arbitration. 
Motioiti to Compel Arbitration and Ruling on Discovery Motions 
Over two years after Plaintiff filed its Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation on May 24, 2004. (R. 677.) Aside from its 
affirmative defenses, this was the first time Defendants raised a right to arbitration. 
Plaintiff promptly opposed Defendants' Motion, demonstrating that Defendants had been 
litigating the case for over two years and that sending the case to arbitration now would 
severely prejudice Plaintiff. (R. 688.) Plaintiff attached twelve exhibits to its 
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memorandum detailing the extensive discovery that Defendants had engaged in and 
Defendants' multiple motions and pleadings submitted to the court. (R. 699.) 
On June 14, 2004, the court heard oral argument on the parties' pending discovery 
motions {i.e., Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Defendants' Motion for Protective Order) 
and on Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1162.) The parties argued their 
respective discovery motions first. The court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, 
denied Defendants' Motion for Protective Order (R. 1162, Tr. 63), and later entered a 
written ruling explaining its decision (R. 1253, Add. 40.) 
The court then heard argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. In 
addition to its waiver argument, counsel for Plaintiff argued that Defendants were 
estopped from seeking to compel arbitration at this late date. (R. 1162, Tr. 88.) 
Expressing its incredulity at Defendants' Motion, the court asked Defendants' counsel: 
"Why didn't [Defendants] push this before, or is there something in the file I've missed 
that they were pushing arbitration?" {Id. at 69.) The court also informed Defendants that 
this was "an unusual motion to be brought this late in the game." {Id. at 49.) After taking 
the matter under advisement, the court denied Defendants' Motion in a five-page written 
ruling dated June 28, 2004. (Add. 1.) Under relevant case law, the court found that 
Defendants participated in litigation to an extent inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. 
Specifically, the court noted: 
[T]he defendants filed an answer, filed a counterclaim, filed two separate 
motions to dismiss, held an attorney planning meeting, served discovery 
requests upon the plaintiff and obtained substantial information, responded 
to plaintiffs discovery requests, took part in conference calls, defended 
depositions, took depositions in Utah of persons who reside in Singapore, 
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and finally filed a protective order relative to the production of their 
electronic documents. [Add. 4.] 
Moreover, the court found that forcing Plaintiff to arbitrate the case at such a late date 
would prejudice Plaintiff because: (1) "[Defendants in this action have participated in 
discovery far beyond that which would be allowed in arbitration"; (2) Plaintiff "has 
expended substantial resources while participating in pretrial motions and discovery"; 
and (3) "the Iwo years of experience that [Defendants have had in this case, including 
significant motion practice, has effectively allowed them to test the judicial waters." For 
these reasons, the court held that Defendants had waived their right to arbitrate the 
dispute. (Add. 4-5.) 
Discovery Conducted After Denial of Motion To Compel Arbitration 
Defendants continued to conduct discovery even after the court denied their 
Motion to Compel Arbitration, including corresponding with Plaintiff regarding 
discovery (R. 1069-75), participating in the depositions of Paul Dawson and Anthony 
Pilaro (R. 1106, 1324), filing a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions aigainst Plaintiff 
(accompanied by a thirteen-page memorandum, which included thirteen exhibits totaling 
over 227 pages of documents) (R. 846), and later filing a seven-page document styled 
"Report and Request for Further Court Intervention Concerning Production of Discovery 
Electronic Data" (R. 1094). On July 13, 2004, the court held a hearing on the parties' 
discovery motions and ordered Defendants to produce certain electronic documents to 
Plaintiff within six weeks at Defendants' expense. (R. 1120.) 
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On July 16, 2004, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's 
denial of their Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1136.) However, Defendants 
continued to conduct discovery even after filing their Notice of Appeal by filing 
memoranda with the court regarding discovery (R. 1243, 1259), and serving discovery 
responses on Plaintiff (R. 1257, 1299). 
On August 16, 2004, before the court could respond to the pending discovery 
motions, Defendants filed a Motion to Determine Jurisdiction and accompanying 
memorandum, arguing that their appeal of the order denying arbitration divested the court 
of jurisdiction. (R. 1288.) On September 2, 2004, the court entered an order staying 
further proceedings in the district court pending further direction from the appellate court. 
(R. 1307, Add. 45.) On October 17, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court granted Defendants' 
motion to stay proceedings in the district court pending the appeal. (R. 1319.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants have waived the right to arbitrate by extensive participation in this 
litigation for over two years. Defendants filed two motions to dismiss and actively 
participated in discovery, including service of multiple discovery requests on Plaintiff 
and receiving thousands of documents in response, taking four days of depositions and 
participating in seven other depositions, filing a motion for protective order, responding 
to Plaintiffs discovery motions, attending hearings and obtaining rulings from the district 
court. 
Compelled arbitration at this late date would plainly prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
expended substantial recourses in responding to Defendants' motions to dismiss and 
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Defendants' other filings, conducting discovery, and in obtaining favorable rulings from 
the court on Plaintiffs discovery motions. Given these facts, the district court properly 
concluded that Defendants had waived their right to arbitrate this dispute by participating 
in litigation to an extent inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, resulting in prejudice to 
Plaintiff if arbitration is now compelled. 
Allowing Defendants to arbitrate at this late date would not further public policy 
that generally favors arbitration. Arbitration is intended to serve as a cost-effective and 
efficient alternative to litigation, not as a second-chance forum for parties who are 
disappointed with their results in a court. The fact that Defendants raised arbitration as 
an affirmative defense does not require a different result when the rest of Defendants' 
conduct unequivocally indicates an intent to litigate, not arbitrate. Defendants seek 
arbitration now only for purposes of obfuscation and delay. 
ARGUMENT 
The parties' Agreement is governed by the version of the Utah Arbitration Act 
(the "UAA") that was in effect when the parties entered into the Agreement.2 The 
relevant provision of the UAA states that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing or 
future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon 
grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement^ Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3 la-3 (2002) (emp. add.) (Add. 55). Waiver is such a ground. 
2
 The former UAA was repealed on May 15, 2003. However, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3 la-131 provides that "an arbitration agreement made before May 6, 2002 shall be 
governed by the arbitration act in force on the date the agreement was signed." (Add. 
57.) As the Agreement was signed February 6, 1998, Defendants agree that the 2002 
version of the Utah Arbitration Act governs this appeal. (Brief of Appellants, pp. 2-3.) 
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Consistent with the language of section 78-3 la-3, it is well-established that a 
contractual right to arbitration—like other contractual rights—may be waived. See Cedar 
Surgery Ctr., L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58,1 14, 96 P.3d 911. Indeed, Defendants do 
not dispute this settled principle on appeal. The seminal Utah case on waiver as applied 
to arbitration clauses is Chandler v. Blue Cross, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), in which the 
Utah Supreme Court propounded a two-part test to determine whether a litigant had 
waived his right to arbitrate a particular dispute. First, the "party seeking arbitration must 
participate in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration." Id. at 359. Second, 
the delay in seeking arbitration must result in "prejudice" to the opposing party. Id. "The 
party claiming waiver has the burden of establishing substantial participation and 
prejudice." Id. 
As discussed below, the district court correctly applied Chandler's two-prong test 
in denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. After a thorough and thoughtful 
analysis, the district court concluded that Defendants had waived their right to arbitration 
because they actively participated in litigation for over two years, and Plaintiff would be 
prejudiced by arbitration now. (Add. 3-5.) This Court should affirm that ruling. 
POINT I: DEFENDANTS HAVE UNEQUIVOCALLY WAIVED THEIR 
RIGHT TO ARBITRATE THIS DISPUTE. 
A. Defendants Participated in Litigation To A Point Inconsistent With 
The Intent To Arbitrate. 
L Legal Standard for Participation in Litigation. 
In Chandler v. Blue Cross, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
was called upon to determine the "standard [that] should be employed in determining 
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whether a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration." Id. at 358. As the issue 
was one of first impression for the court, it conducted a thorough review of case law from 
other jurisdictions. The court recognized "the strong public policy in favor of arbitration 
'as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court 
congestion.'" Id. The court also recognized, however, that "[t]he policies favoring 
arbitration are largely defeated when the right of arbitration is not raised until an 
opposing party has undertaken much of the expense necessary to prepare a case for trial." 
Id. at 361. Moreover, the court recognized "an affirmative duty to enforce contractual 
rights." Id. at 360. Accordingly, the first prong of the Chandler test asks whether the 
party claiming the right to arbitrate has "participated] in litigation to a point inconsistent 
with the intent to arbitrate." Id. The court cautioned that the inquiry is a fact-intensive 
one, and that the outcome would vary depending on the circumstances of a particular 
case. 
In Chandler, the court readily found that the defendant had participated in 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate by filing an answer, filing a 
cross-claim, and participating in discovery for five months. Specifically, before filing its 
motion to compel arbitration, the defendant "participated in" five depositions, "circulated 
a stipulation for a protective order among all parties," received two requests for 
production of documents from plaintiffs and one set of interrogatories from a co-
defendant, and served its own set of interrogatories and requests for production on the 
plaintiffs. Id. at 357. The court concluded that "[t]hese actions clearly manifest an intent 
to proceed to trial." Id. at 360. 
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The Utah Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the Chandler analysis in Central 
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599. In Parhvest, 
the court found no waiver, but on facts very different from those presented in Chandler 
and the instant case. In Parkwest, the defendant sent the plaintiff a letter three days after 
receiving the plaintiffs complaint stating that the filing of the complaint was improper 
because the parties5 agreed to arbitrate any dispute that arose between them. Shortly 
thereafter, the defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. The defendant did not 
mention arbitration in its answer, but in its counterclaim the defendant raised the issue of 
arbitration—and argued that the filing of the plaintiffs complaint breached the parties' 
agreement—in over five separate instances. On the same day that the defendant filed its 
answer and counterclaim, it also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the 
plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because the parties agreed to arbitrate. The 
defendant attached to its motion the letter that it previously sent to the plaintiff informing 
her that her complaint was improper in light of the parties' arbitration agreement. In a 
minute entry, the court indicated that it would grant the defendant's motion to dismiss as 
to one of plaintiff s claims but deny it as to the other claim. Before the court entered its 
order, the defendant participated in a scheduling conference, submitted a scheduling 
order to the court, and provided initial disclosures to the plaintiff. The court subsequently 
issued its order granting the defendant's motion in part and denying it in part. Ten days 
later, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration as to the remaining claim, which 
the trial court denied. In all, exactly four months had elapsed from filing of the 
complaint. 
17 
In determining whether the defendant had participated in litigation to the point 
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, the Parkwest court explained as follows: 
[The] first part of the Chandler test looks at the actions of the party seeking 
arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation. Participation 
in discovery and other aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve 
the court are factors we consider in trying to ascertain a party's intent or 
attitude toward its participation in litigation. Requests made of the court by 
the parties, however, have even greater weight. We consider especially 
important whether the parties' requests of the court demonstrate an intent 
to pursue litigation or whether they demonstrate an intent to avoid 
litigation and a desire to be sent to arbitrate. Accordingly, parties seeking 
to enforce arbitration should ensure that the court, not just the opposing 
party, is informed that arbitration is desired. In doing so, judicial resources 
will be appropriately conserved. [Id. at ^ 26, emp. add.]. 
Applying Chandler to the facts before it, the court held that the defendant had not 
participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. In so holding, 
the court recognized that the defendant had participated to a limited extent in litigation. 
Id. at Tflj 27-28. However, through its letter to counsel (sent three days after the complaint 
was filed) and the arguments contained in its counterclaim and motion to dismiss, based 
on the right to arbitrate, the defendant clearly "apprised both [the plaintiff] and the court 
of its position that litigation of the matter was improper, of its reluctance to litigate, and 
of its intent to arbitrate." Id. at \ 31. Given these circumstances, the court found no 
waiver of arbitration. Id. at ffl[ 33-34. 
While Chandler and Parkwest highlight the fact-intensive nature of the 
"participation in litigation" prong of the Chandler test, the cases are nevertheless easily 
reconciled with one another. Simply put, courts will not countenance litigants' attempts 
to test the "judicial waters" by invoking the court's jurisdiction and utilizing its resources 
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in a significant way before filing a motion to compel arbitration. Thus, when a party has 
participated in litigation, courts will closely scrutinize that participation to determine 
whether it evidences an intent to pursue redress through litigation as opposed to 
arbitration. While Utah law favors arbitration as an alternative to litigation, the policy is 
ill-served by forcing a party to arbitration after years of costly, full-scale litigation. As 
shown below, the facts of the present case are much closer to Chandler than Parkwest. 
2. Defendants' Actions Evidence An Intent to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, 
In determining whether Defendants intended to litigate this dispute in a judicial 
forum, one of the most telling factors is that Defendants waited over two years before 
filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1, 677.) Defendants' claimed desire to submit 
this matter to arbitration simply cannot be reconciled with the length of time it took them 
to properly assert that right. Indeed, many decisions have found waiver when the delay 
was much less serious. See, e.g., Chandler, 833 P.2d 360 (waiver after five months); 
Mano v. Geissler, 321 F. Supp. 2d 588, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2004 (waiver after seventeen 
months); Davis v. Cont'I Airlines, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 205, 213 (1997) (waiver after six 
months), cert, denied, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 974; Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v. 
Architects, 709 P.2d 184, 185 (N.M. 1985) (waiver after one year). 
Moreover, Defendants engaged in multiple rounds of attacks to the pleadings and 
actively participated in discovery, which was hotly contested from the start. (R. 690-91; 
Add. 47-53.) During the two years of litigation before filing their Motion to Compel 
Arbitration, Defendants, inter alia, filed an answer and counterclaim (R. 23, 34); two 
motions to dismiss (R. 39, 121); a motion for protective order (R. 379); a joint motion 
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regarding production of documents (R. 373); and five joint motions regarding 
scheduling. Defendants also responded to Plaintiffs discovery requests (R. 92, 220, 
245); served two sets of discovery, and received thousands of documents in response;4 
took two depositions and participated in seven more (R. 690-91, 693); participated in oral 
argument before the court on two occasions and in a conference call on another occasion 
(Add. 10, 33; R. 229); and generated stacks of correspondence regarding discovery (R. 
201, 382, 915). Even after Defendants filed their Motion to Compel, they continued to 
correspond with Plaintiff regarding discovery (R. 1069-75), participated in two 
depositions (R. 1106, 1324), filed two discovery motions (R. 846, 1094), responded to 
Plaintiffs discovery motion (R. 1243), and served discovery responses on Plaintiff (R. 
1257, 1299). 
In Chandler, the court readily found "an intent to proceed to trial" given the five-
month delay during which time defendant filed an answer and cross-claim, participated in 
five depositions, circulated a protective order, received two sets of discovery from 
plaintiffs and served its own set of discovery on the plaintiffs. Id. at 357, 360. 
Defendants' participation in this case far exceeds the participation found to constitute 
waiver in Chandler. Given this extensive participation, it would be a serious deviation 
from Chandler to hold that defendants have not waived their right to arbitrate in this case. 
Moreover, Defendants' participation in litigation far exceeds that of Chandler on a 
qualitative scale as well as a quantitative one. The defendant in Chandler filed no 
3
 (Add. 7, 11, 14,28,36,38.) 
4
 (R. 866, 881, 367, 1165, 1032, 948.) 
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dispositive motions nor did it become embroiled in discovery disputes requiring the trial 
court's attention, yet the court still found waiver. In this case, Defendants made 
numerous requests of the district court, which, under Parkwest, carry "great[ ] weight" in 
determining a party's intent. 2002 UT 3 at f 26. Specifically, before filing their Motion 
to Compel Arbitration in this case, Defendants filed a counterclaim (R.34); two motions 
to dismiss (R. 39, 121); a motion for protective order (R. 379); and filed jointly with 
Plaintiff one motion regarding production of documents and five scheduling orders.5 In a 
defensive posture, Defendants vigorously opposed Plaintiffs' Motions with extensive 
legal memoranda and exhibits. (R. 234, 497.) In fact, Defendants filed hundreds of 
papers with the district court, contributing in large part to the 1,333-page record on 
appeal. (Add. 47-53.) In addition, the district court held hearings and listened to oral 
arguments on three occasions (Add. 10, 33; R. 229), issued seven rulings, four of which 
were written rulings; and reviewed and signed eight orders pertaining to the case. 
Plainly, Defendants' filings and requests of the court demonstrate an intent "to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation." Parkwest, 2002 UT 3, 
126. 
Despite Defendants' extensive participation in litigation, Defendants attempt to 
align the facts of the instant case with those of Parkwest. First, relying on Parkwest, 
Defendants argue that a finding of waiver is precluded because they raised arbitration as 
5
 (Add. 7, 11, 14,28,36,38.) 
6
 (R. 327, 821; Add. 10, 13, 30, 40, 43.) 
7(R. 324; Add. 7, 11, 14, 16,18,28,36,38.) 
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an affirmative defense. (Brief of Appellants at p. 14-15.) Second, Defendants argue that 
their participation in litigation was reluctant and unwilling, as in Parkwest. (Brief of 
Appellants at pp. 15-16.) Neither of Defendants' arguments withstands scrutiny. 
As for Defendants' first argument, it must be remembered that the defendant in 
Parkwest raised arbitration with the plaintiff and with the trial court on multiple 
occasions. First, the defendant corresponded with the plaintiff three days after receiving 
the complaint, informing her that the complaint was improper in light of the parties' 
agreement to arbitrate. 2002 UT 3 at ^ 3. In contrast, Defendants here did not so much 
as hint at arbitration in any of their correspondence with Plaintiff, which was voluminous. 
(R. 408.) Then the defendant in Parkwest filed a counterclaim which was literally 
peppered with references to arbitration. 2002 UT 3 at f^ 5. In contrast, Defendants in this 
case never mentioned arbitration in their counterclaim. (R. 34). The defendant in 
Parkwest filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs complaint 
should be dismissed because the parties agreed to arbitrate. 2002 UT 3 at f 6. By 
contrast, Defendants in this case never mentioned arbitration in either of their two 
motions to dismiss. (R. 46, 121.) And importantly, the defendant in Parkwest waited 
only four months before filing a motion to compel arbitration, during which time it 
conducted extremely minimal discovery by participating in a scheduling conference, 
submitting an accompanying order, and providing initial disclosures to the plaintiff. 
2002 UT 3 at ^[ 8-9. By contrast, as detailed at length above, Defendants participated 
extensively in discovery and waited two years before filing a motion to compel 
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arbitration. (Add. 47-53.) Due to the stark contrast between the two cases, Defendants' 
reliance on Parkwest is unavailing. 
Moreover, the fact that Defendants mentioned arbitration as one of numerous 
affirmative defenses in their answers is not enough to excuse their two-year active 
participation in litigation, when all other facts belie any intent to arbitrate. For example, 
in Mano v. Geissler, supra, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants based on 
an agreement containing an arbitration clause. The parties proceeded to litigate the case 
over the next seventeen months. For the defendants' part, they answered the complaint, 
"conducted extensive pre-trial discovery, including the taking of plaintiff s deposition, 
sought the aid of th[e c]ourt to resolve a discovery dispute and participated in three 
conferences." 321 F. Supp. at 594. Three months before trial, the defendants filed a 
motion to compel arbitration. Applying a test substantially similar to the Chandler test, 
the court held that "[t]he fact that defendants let seventeen months elapse before filing 
their motion shortly before trial supports a finding of waiver." Id. Moreover, the court 
concluded as follows: 
The mere fact that defendants included the existence of the 
Arbitration Clause as an affirmative defense in their Answer does not 
require a different result. When a complaint has been filed in a judicial 
forum, the proper way for a defendant to assert an entitlement to arbitration 
is by way of motion, not by pleading it as an affirmative defense or a 
counterclaim in his answer. Th[e waiver] analysis does not place any 
special emphasis upon whether the defendant mentioned the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate in his answer. [Id. at 595, internal citations omitted, 
emp. add.] 
Similarly, in Davis v. Continental Airlines, supra, the defendants raised arbitration 
as an affirmative defense but then waited six months to file a motion to compel 
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arbitration. In the meantime, the defendants availed themselves of court discovery 
procedures to obtain documents and to take the plaintiffs deposition. The court rejected 
the "[d]efendants['] claim that because they raised [arbitration] as an affirmative defense 
in their answers, they cannot possibly be held to have waived arbitration, no matter what 
their conduct subsequent to filing their answers." 59 Cal. App. 4th at 215-16. Such an 
argument, the court held, "is not persuasive and is not supported by the authorities 
defendants cite." Id. at 216. In concluding that the defendants had waived their right to 
arbitrate by eivailing themselves of judicial discovery procedures, id. at 217, the court 
pointed out that "[a] defendant may not merely assert failure to arbitrate as an affirmative 
Q 
defense but must seek a stay and demand arbitration." Id. at 216 n.3. 
Like the defendants in the above cases, Defendants raised arbitration as a defense 
but then did not so much as hint at it again, despite their extensive communications with 
The holdings of Mano and Davis—that raising arbitration as a defense does not 
preclude a finding of waiver—is well-supported by other decisions. See, e.g., 
Sobremonte v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. ELptr. 2d 43, 54 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Mere 
announcement of the right to compel arbitration [as an affirmative defense] is not enough. 
To properly invoke the right to arbitrate, a party must (1) timely raise the defense and 
take affirmative steps to implement the process, and (2) participate in conduct consistent 
with the intent to arbitrate the dispute."); Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v. Architects, 
supra, 709 P.2d at 187 ("Mere mention of such a right as an affirmative defense in the 
answer to a complaint does suffice to keep the right alive. The right expires, however, 
when the parly asserting it takes significant action inconsistent with the right. Waiver of 
the right may be inferred from any decision to take advantage of the judicial system, 
whether through discovery or direct invocation of the court's discretionary power, or 
both."); De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770, 772-73 (N.Y. 1974) (despite the fact 
that defendant raised the right to arbitration in his answer, defendant waived the right by 
taking plaintiffs deposition because "utilization of judicial discovery procedures is . . . an 
affirmative acceptance of the judicial forum" and "[t]he courtroom may not be used as a 
convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall so as to allow a party to create his own unique 
structure combining litigation and arbitration"). 
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Plaintiff and with the court during the two-year period, during which time they 
participated extensively in discovery and other litigation. (R. 388-96, 423-53; Add. 47-
53.) If merely raising arbitration as a defense were enough to preserve the right, 
regardless of a party's subsequent conduct, a party could raise arbitration as an 
affirmative defense and then litigate a dispute for several years before bringing a motion 
to compel arbitration. Defendants cite no authority to support this proposition. 
The second way in which Defendants attempt to bring this case within the ambit of 
Parkwest is by characterizing their participation in the underlying litigation as "reluctant 
and unwilling" due to their purported desire to arbitrate. (Brief of Appellants at pp. 15-
16.) In Parkwest, the court characterized the defendant's participation as "reluctant and 
unwilling" because the defendant explicitly notified the opposing party and the court via 
its correspondence, pleadings, and motion to dismiss that the filing of the plaintiffs 
complaint was wrongful because the parties had agreed to arbitrate. 2002 UT 3 at f129-
31. Moreover, the defendant's involvement in discovery was exceedingly limited, and it 
waited only four months to file its motion to compel arbitration. Id. at f^f 8-9. 
In this case, by contrast, the only evidence of "reluctance" that Defendants point to 
is their dilatory conduct during discovery, which forced Plaintiff to file two motions to 
compel (R. 177, 492), required the district court to hold two hearings and enter multiple 
rulings and orders, and which finally culminated in sanctions against Defendants (R. 229, 
718; Add. 18, 33). In reality, Defendants' argument amounts to what must be an 
extremely rare bid wherein they ask this Court to reward them for their dilatory tactics in 
conducting discovery below. It bears emphasizing that it is not enough under Parkwest 
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to be "reluctant" to litigate (a category in which many litigants would find themselves), 
but the reluctance must be due to an intent to arbitrate, not litigate. 2002 UT 3 f 29. 
If Defendants were truly unwilling to participate in litigation due to their purported 
desire to arbitrate, that unwillingness was not manifest. In the stacks of correspondence 
generated in this litigation (much of it generated by Defendants), Defendants never so 
much as hinted that their stalling tactics were due to the purported desire to arbitrate. 
(R. 388-96, 423-53.) And aside from their affirmative defenses, Defendants never raised 
arbitration in any of their motions and memoranda or at any of their appearances before 
the district court prior to filing their Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 34, 39, 121, 299, 
373, 379; Add. 10, 33, 47-53.) Defendants' assertions on appeal simply cannot be 
reconciled with their actions below. Without doubt, Defendants have participated in 
litigation to an extent inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. 
5. Defendants' Policy Arguments Are Unpersuasive. 
Defendants spend a great deal of time touting the "strong Utah policy favoring 
arbitration" and arguing that this policy inexorably precludes a finding of waiver in this 
case. (Brief of Appellants, p. 14.) Conspicuously absent from Defendants' brief, 
however, is the actual reason Utah law favors arbitration: it is to encourage potential 
litigants to arbitrate, not litigate. See Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, f 17, 99 P.3d 842 
("The use of arbitration as an alternative to traditional judicial proceedings should . . . be 
encouraged.") (Emp. add.) Accordingly, the policy is "largely defeated when the right of 
arbitration is not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the expense 
necessary to prepare a case for trial." Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 361; see also 
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Buckner, supra, 2004 UT 78 at ^ 17 ("Arbitration proceedings benefit the parties by 
providing 'a method more expeditious and less expensive [than the court system] for the 
resolution of disputes.'") (Alteration in original, citation omitted.) Consequently, when 
litigation has not been avoided—but has been actively pursued for two years—any 
presumption of non-waiver dissipates. 
Requiring early exercise of arbitration rights serves public policy in several 
respects. First, parties are on notice that a contractual right to arbitration, as any other 
contractual right, must be affirmatively enforced within a reasonable period of time. See 
Cedar Surgery Ctr.3 supra, 2004 UT 58 at 1f 14, Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 360. 
Second, litigants are not tempted to try their luck at litigation for months or even years 
(as in this case), only to force arbitration after finding unsuccessful results in litigation. 
See De Sapio, supra, 321 N.E.2d at 772-73 ("[t]he courtroom may not be used as a 
convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall"). When the policy of arbitration is fleshed 
out and discussed in a meaningful fashion, it is clear that allowing Defendants to arbitrate 
at this juncture would not support—but would in fact flout—Utah policy regarding 
arbitration. For these reasons, Defendants' policy arguments ring especially hollow.9 
9
 Whilst conceding that the former version of the UAA controls, Defendants 
nevertheless urge the Court to base its decision on Defendants' interpretation of the new 
act. (Brief of Appellants, p. 21-23.) The Court should decline Defendants' request, as it 
is undisputed that the new act is inapplicable to this appeal. In any event, Defendants' 
position is not helped by relying on the new act, as the waiver provision in the new act is 
nearly identical to that of the former act. The former version states: "A written 
agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, 
or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (2002) (emphasis added). (Add. 55.) Similarly, the new version states: 
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B. Compelling Arbitration Would Prejudice Plaintiff Because of the 
Time And Resources Spent Litigating This Case For Two Years 
If the first prong of Chandler is satisfied, i.e., the party seeking arbitration has 
"participate[d] in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration," the determination 
of waiver "rests solely on a finding of prejudice." Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 359. 
1. Legal Standard For A Finding Of Prejudice. 
Prejudice "must result from the delay in the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not 
from factors that are inherent in arbitration itself, such as the severance of a claim or 
limitations on remedies." Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 359. In examining dozens of 
waiver cases from other jurisdictions, the Chandler court recognized that "there is 
general agreement concerning the prejudicial nature of certain factual situations." Id. 
Courts have recognized that prejudice can occur if a party gains an 
advantage in arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures. Courts 
have also stated that prejudice exists when the party seeking arbitration is 
attempting to forum-shop after "the judicial waters [have] . . . been tested." 
In addition, prejudice has been found in situations where the party seeking 
arbitration allows the opposing party to undergo the types of expenses that 
arbitration is designed to alleviate, such as the expense of preparing to 
argue important pretrial motions or the expense of conducting discovery 
procedures that are not available in arbitration. [Id., footnotes and citations 
omitted.] 
[cont.] "An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or 
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, 
and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of 
a contract." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-107(l) (emp. add). As the district court pointed 
out in its ruling denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration, one of the grounds 
that "exists at law" for the revocation of an agreement is the doctrine of waiver (Add. 3), 
and this is the same under both the old and the new act. Even under the new act, a trial 
court need not order the parties to arbitrate if "it finds that there is no enforceable 
agreement to arbitrate," as the court found in this case based on waiver. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-31a-108(l)(b). 
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Logically, then, courts should not "allow a party to suffer prejudice because an opposing 
party has failed to timely assert a contractual right." Id. at 360. 
In Chandler, the court concluded that "prejudice was apparent from [the 
defendant's] participation in discovery" as well as the fact that "there are multiple 
defendants in the case." Id. The court observed that through the discovery process the 
defendants were able to glean information regarding their defenses in the case, 
information that "could now be used in arbitration to the detriment of [the] plaintiffs." 
Id. 361. Moreover, the court recognized that discovery was available only to "a limited 
degree" in arbitration, and that the defendants thereby obtained a benefit "from its delay 
in the assertion of the right to arbitrate that would not have been available had [it] timely 
moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration." Id. Finally, the court found 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by the expense they "undertook in conducting discovery into 
[defendant's] liability and in preparing to respond to [defendant's] discovery request." 
Id. 
Although Chandler is the only Utah case to address prejudice in the context of 
waiver of arbitration,10 Chandler's characterization of prejudice is well-supported by 
other cases. For example, in Taos, supra, (cited in Chandler), the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico substantiated Chandler's depiction of arbitration, "tak[ing] judicial notice of the 
fact that the scope of discovery is considerably diminished under arbitration, a result of 
the trade-off in favor of efficient and speedy resolution." 709 P.2d at 186. Moreover, the 
10
 As the first prong of Chandler was not satisfied in Par lew est, the Utah Supreme 
Court did not address prejudice in that case. 
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court agreed that prejudice often occurs when a party is induced to participate in the 
discovery process, which "can be a substantial burden, both of money and time." Id. For 
these reasons, the court held that the plaintiff was prejudiced when the defendant 
propounded interrogatories on the plaintiff before filing a motion to compel arbitration. 
Id. at 185-86. 
Similarly, in Snelling & Smiling, Inc. v. Reynolds, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (D. Fla. 
2001), the court noted that "the length of delay in demanding arbitration and the expense 
incurred by the opposing party" are both valid factors in determining whether prejudice 
has occurred. Id. at 1322. Thus, "[a] substantial invocation of the litigation process that 
is combined with forcing the opposing party to litiga[te] issues [that] could have been 
alleviated through arbitration^ is a sufficient finding of prejudice to constitute a waiver." 
Id. at 1323. In Snelling, the court found prejudice where the defendants "waited over 
fourteen months before filing a motion to compel arbitration" during which time the 
plaintiffs "incurred the expense of responding to [the defendants' discovery requests" 
and were forced to litigate the defendants' summary judgment motion on two of the 
plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 1322-23.n 
11
 AccordHoxworth v. Blinder, 980 F.2d 912, 926-27 (3rd Cir. 1992) (finding "ample 
record of prejudice" where defendants waited eleven months to file a motion to compel 
arbitration and, in the meantime, participated in pretrial proceedings, filed a motion to 
dismiss contesting the merits of plaintiffs' claims, took multiple depositions, and 
prompted plaintiffs to file discovery motions by their conduct during discovery); Liggett 
& Myers Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding 
prejudice where third-party defendant waited ten months before moving to compel 
arbitration, during which time defendant "actively participated in the deposition of parties 
or witnesses" and "examined and made copies of documents," including "transcripts of 
all depositions taken prior to his entry into the case," which procedures would not have 
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In summary, prejudice is demonstrated when the party seeking to compel 
arbitration: (1) "gains an advantage in arbitration through participation in pretrial 
procedures" such as discovery, Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359; (2) attempts to test the 
"judicial waters" by litigating, id.; or (3) causes the opposing party to incur expenses in 
discovery or in responding to pretrial motions, id., especially when those motions contest 
the merits of the opposing parties' claims, Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 927. Of course, the 
length of delay is an important consideration in all three types of prejudice. See Snelling, 
140 F. Supp.2datl322. 
2. The Elements of Prejudice Are Manifest in This Case. 
The district court correctly concluded that all three types of prejudice identified in 
Chandler are present in the instant case. (Add. 4-5.) First, Defendants have gained an 
advantage through litigating this dispute that would not be available to them in arbitration 
and that "could now be used in arbitration to the detriment of [P]laintiff[]." Chandler, 
supra, 833 P.2d at 361. As the court recognized in Chandler, discovery is available only 
to "a limited degree" in arbitration. 833 P.2d 361. Indeed this proposition is so well-
established that most courts merely note as much in passing, see, e.g., Liggett, supra, 380 
F. Supp. at 1047-48, or in the alternative, take judicial notice of the fact. Taos, supra, 
709 P.2d at 186. Of course, the sole reason arbitration exists is to provide "'a method 
[cont] been available in arbitration); Sobremonte, supra, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 (finding 
prejudice where defendant waited ten months before moving to compel arbitration, 
during which time defendant "used the judicial process" to its advantage by filing 
demurrers to plaintiffs' claims and propounded discovery on plaintiffs, because such 
tactics caused plaintiffs to incur costs and expenses and unwittingly disclose trial 
strategies). 
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more expeditious and less expensive [than the court system] for the resolution of 
disputes.'" Buckner, supra, 2004 UT 78,^ 17. If, as Defendants argue, discovery were 
allowed on the same scale in arbitration as in litigation (and thereby as expensive and 
time-consuming as litigation), there would be little reason for an alternative forum. 
Moreover, in speculating that discovery in this case is "perfectly consistent with 
what would be allowed in arbitration," Defendants seriously mischaracterize their 
participation in discovery thus far. (Brief of Appellants, p. 19.) While Defendants took 
i ^ two depositions, they participated in nine depositions total. Moreover, Defendants did 
not receive responses to only one set of discovery requests, as they allege. (Brief of 
Appellants, p. 19.) Defendants served discovery requests on Plaintiff in July 2002 (R. 
866), and in August 2003 (R. 365), long before they filed their Motion to Compel 
Arbitration in May 2004, and Plaintiff responded to both of those discovery requests (R. 
367, 881, 1032). Moreover, at Defendants' urging (R. 915, 1161), Plaintiffs 
supplemented their discovery responses on multiple occasions (R. 88 I, 948, 1165). By 
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In arguing that they have gained no unfair advantage by litigating this dispute for 
two years, Defendants cite various provisions of the Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association ("AAA"). However, none of the rules Defendants cite supports Defendants' 
position. Even assuming this case fits within the criteria for "Large, Complex Comerica 
Disputes," as Defendants allege, those rules state that the scope of discovery is entirely 
within the arbitrator's discretion. (Brief of Appellant, Ex. 3, Rule L-3(a)-(j)). In fact, 
depositions may be wholly excluded from arbitration proceedings: Rule L-3(f) states that 
"matters to be considered" at the preliminary hearing include "whether, and the extent to 
which, any sworn statements and/or depositions may be introduced." (Emp. add.) 
Likewise, Rule L-4(c) states that "the arbitrator(s) may place such limitations on the 
conduct of such discovery as the arbitrator(s) shall deem appropriate." (Brief of 
Appellants, Ex. 3.) 
13
 (R. 743, 1079, 1088, 401, 402, 404, 595, 598, 1106, 1324.) 
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Plaintiffs estimate, it provided Defendants over 3,200 documents in discovery. (R. 693.) 
Moreover, Defendants say nothing of the motions and memoranda filed in this litigation 
by both parties, wherein Plaintiff was induced to "unwittingly disclose [its] strategies." 
Sobremonte, supra, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. Given the length of time Defendants 
participated in discovery and the volume of documents they obtained, the district court 
correctly concluded that Defendants obtained an advantage in litigation that would 
prejudice Plaintiff if forced to arbitrate at this late date. 
Plaintiff has also incurred the second type of prejudice identified in Chandler in 
that—as the district court pointed out—it has expended a great deal of time and resources 
litigating this case. (Add. 5.) In response, Defendants advance the startling proposition 
that Plaintiffs counsel may be litigating this case for free or may have entered into some 
other atypical arrangement with Plaintiff. (Brief of Appellants, p. 18.) However, 
Defendants know that Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees because they bitterly contested 
Plaintiffs attorney fees that Defendants were ordered to pay in conjunction with 
Plaintiffs first motion to compel. (R. 229, 345.) Thus, as is well-documented in 
Defendants' five-page Objection to Plaintiffs Affidavit for Attorney's Fees, Plaintiffs 
counsel is not litigating this case for free or for a discounted rate. (R. 211, 234.) Plaintiff 
has been litigating this case for two years, during which time it filed and responded to 
several motions and prepared and responded to extensive discovery. (Add. 47-53.) As 
just two examples of Plaintiff s expenses, Plaintiffs lawyers traveled to Defendants' 
office in California and spent nearly one week reviewing documents at Defendants' 
warehouse. (R. 383, 479.) Moreover, Plaintiffs principals traveled to Salt Lake City 
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from Singapore for four days of depositions conducted by Defendants. (R. 691, 743, 
1079, 1088.) 
Finally, the third type of prejudice exists in this case because Defendants' conduct 
demonstrates a blatant attempt "to forum-shop after 'the judicial waters [have] . . . been 
tested.5" Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 359 (citation omitted). Defendants were 
ultimately unsuccessful in getting any of Plaintiff s claims dismissed with their two 
motions to dismiss. (Add. 10, 30.) Defendants were also unsuccessful in resisting 
Plaintiffs discovery requests and were ordered to pay Plaintiffs attorney fees incurred in 
preparing its motion to compel. (R. 229 Add. 16.) Defendants were also chastised by 
the court on more than one occasion for failure to respond to discovery. (Add. 33.) 
Defendants have resisted producing their electronic financial information and 
correspondence throughout discovery, and even filed a Motion for Protective Order. 
(R. 379.) Three days before Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal, the court ordered 
Defendants to produce these electronic documents and to bear the expense of doing so. 
(R. 1120.) It is not surprising, then, that Defendants now make a last-ditch effort to 
postpone resolution of Plaintiff s claims by invoking arbitration and staying the litigation. 
However, the Court should not countenance Defendants' attempt to exploit the judicial 
system in this fashion, engaging in litigation and then invoking arbitration for apparent 
tactical purposes of obfiiscation and delay. 
In summary, the district court correctly concluded that Defendants waived their 
right to arbitrate because Defendants participated in litigation to an extent inconsistent 
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with the intent to arbitrate, and sending the case to arbitration at this late date would 
plainly prejudice Plaintiff. 
POINT II: AFTER LITIGATING THIS DISPUTE FOR OVER TWO YEARS, 
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM NOW ASSERTING A 
RIGHT TO ARBITRATION. 
The purpose of the equitable doctrine of estoppel is "'to rescue from loss a party 
who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of 
another.5" Plateau Mining Co v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976). 
"The elements of estoppel are '(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the 
claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party 
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.'" Id. (quoting Celebrity 
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)). Accord 
Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App. 1990). 
As discussed at length above, Defendants actively litigated this case for two years 
before bringing their Motion to Compel Arbitration. Defendants' actions were manifestly 
"inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted," i.e., a claimed right to arbitrate this 
dispute. Plateau Mining, supra, 802 P.2d at 728. Moreover, Plaintiff spent countless 
hours and many thousands of dollars litigating this dispute on the good faith belief that 
Defendants had knowingly submitted to a judicial forum. (Add. 47-53; R. 690-91.) For 
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these reasons, forcing Plaintiff to arbitrate the dispute at this juncture would severely 
prejudice Plaintiff. (Add. 4-5; R. 693-95.)14 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's order denying 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of March, 2005. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
David M. Wahlquist 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Karina F. Landward 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 
14
 This Court may also affirm the district court's decision on the alternative ground of 
laches. See Dipoma, supra, 2001 UT 61, at \ 18. "To constitute laches, two elements 
must be established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of [a claimant]; (2) An injury to 
[the party claiming laches] owing to such lack of diligence." Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Defendants' two-
year delay in bringing their motion to compel arbitration shows lack of diligence in 
pursuing arbitration. As Defendants argue in their brief, they knew about and folly 
realized the implications of the arbitration clause when they filed their first answer on 
May 30, 2002. (R. 23.) Yet Defendants did nothing to enforce that right until two years 
later, after Plaintiff had expended many hours and many thousands of dollars litigating 
this dispute. (Add. 47-53.) Defendants advance no excuse for their lack of diligence, and 
they should not be rewarded for sitting on their hands for two years at Plaintiffs expense. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT i 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 m ? g ^h 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE cotyrv <^jr) _ 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a 
Singapore limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, RULING AND ORDER 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., 
A Utah corporation, and BRITESMILE, Case No. 020903521 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation was argued to the court on 
June 14, 2004. Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement. Now, having 
considered the memoranda, arguments, and applicable law, the court DENIES the Motion for the 
following reasons: x& 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 23, 2002, Smile Inc. Asia Pte, Ltd. ("plaintiff) filed a complaint against 
Britesmile Management, Inc. and Britesmile, Inc. ("defendants"). Plaintiffs original complaint 
contained nine claims for relief, originating in a contract between the parties dated February 6, 
1998. On May 21, 2004, more than two years after the Complaint was filed, defendant first 
asked the court to enforce a provision in the original contract that required arbitration of any 
disputes between the parties. Before filing their Motion to Compel Arbitration, defendants 
participated in the litigation by answering the complaint; counterclaiming against plaintiff; filing 
motions to dismiss; being involved in attorney planning meetings; and participating in a lengthy 
discovery process involving numerous motions. The issue now before the court is whether 
defendants have waived their right to compel arbitration in this matter. 
Contrary to defendants' position, the applicable Utah Arbitration Act does not preclude a 
finding of waiver. The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a parties take certain actions, 
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they can waive their right to arbitration. In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 
360 (Utah 1992). the court held that "waiver of a right of arbitration must be based on both a 
finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a 
finding of prejudice." The court further explained that prejudice consists of a delay in the 
assertion to arbitrate, as well as real harm suffered by the party opposing arbitration. Id. at 360. 
Because defendants allege that a newer version of the Utah Arbitration Act applies to this 
action, this Ruling will first address which version the Utah Arbitration Act applies to this 
Motion. The court will then consider whether defendants substantially participated in the 
litigation in a manner that is inconsistent with arbitration and, if so, whether plaintiff will suffer 
prejudice if the motion to compel arbitration is granted. 
DISCUSSION 
1. The 2002 Version of the Act Does Not Apply to This Motion. 
Defendants reliance on the updated version of the Utah Arbitration Act to support their 
motion to compel arbitration is misplaced. In defendants' memorandum in support of their 
motion to compel arbitration, defendants argue that Section 78-31a-107(l) of the Utah Uniform 
Arbitration Act requires arbitration in this matter. At oral argument, defendants further argued 
that the updated Act no longer allows waiver of the right to arbitrate. Defendants argued that 
Utah case law decided before the implementation of the updated code, which interpreted the 
statute as allowing waiver, is no longer valid. However, the updated Act itself invalidates this 
argument. 
Section 78-31a-104. Utah Code Ann. Expressly states that: "this chapter applies to any 
agreement to arbitrate made on or after May 6, 2002. The only exception that addresses 
agreements before that date is set forth in sub-section (2), which provides that the updated code 
"applies to any agreement to arbitrate made before May 6, 2002, if all the parties to the 
agreement or to the arbitration proceeding agree on the record, (emphasis added). No such 
agreement has been made between the parties on the record and the agreement containing the 
arbitration clause was signed on February 6, 1998. 
Section 78-31a-131 further provides that the act "does not affect an atction or proceeding 
commenced or right accrued before this chapter takes effect. Subject to Section 78-3 la-104 of 
this chapter, an arbitration agreement made before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the 
arbitration act in force on the date the agreement was signed." (emphasis added). This action 
commenced on April 23, 2002, when plaintiffs filed their complaint. Considering both factors 
(date of agreement and date of commencement of the action) this Motion is governed by the Act 
as it was construed in Chandler and Parkwest. Both the commencement of the action and the 
signing of the agreement containing the arbitration clause occurred before May 6, 2002, meaning 
that the arbitration act that applies is the one "in force on the date the agreement was signed." 
2 
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The court also finds that even if the 2002 Act applied, defendants' assertion that waiver is 
no longer allowed is unpersuasive. In their memorandum, defendants quote Section 78-31 a-
107(1), which provides: 
An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration 
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the 
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable 
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the 
revocation of a contract. 
One of the grounds that "exists at law" for the revocation of an arbitration agreement (or 
any contract) is the doctrine of waiver. For this reason, defendants cannot rely on this language 
in their motion to compel arbitration. Defendants also quote Section 78-31a-108(l)(b) of the 
Act, which states that when one party opposes a motion to compel arbitration, "the court shall 
proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there 
is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate." (emphasis added). Based on this language, 
defendants argue that the updated Arbitration Act does not allow a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. However, the Act itself gives the court the opportunity to "find" whether there is an 
"enforceable agreement to arbitrate." The enforceability of an arbitration agreement will often 
hinge on whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, as illustrated in earlier case law. See 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360. 
2. Defendants Substantially Participated in the Present Litigation in a Manner 
Inconsistent With An Intent to Arbitrate. 
Because the defendants filed an answer, filed a counterclaim, participated in discovery for 
a lengthy amount of time, and reviewed that discovery, they have substantially participated in the 
present litigation in a manner inconsistent with arbitration. Chandler held that the first 
requirement for a waiver of arbitration rights is "participation in litigation to a point inconsistent 
with the intent to arbitrate." 833 P.2d at 360. The Utah Supreme Court again stated this rule in 
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associations, 40 P.3d 599, 608 (Utah 2002). The 
court held that the party seeking arbitration must "substantially participate in the litigation, to a 
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate." Id. at 608. 
In Chandler, the court held that the defendants had waived their right to arbitration. The 
court noted that the defendant: 
participated in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration. 
Before [defendants] moved to compel arbitration, [they] filed an 
answer, filed a cross-claim, participated in discovery for five months, 
and reviewed the discovery that had already taken place prior to 
[their] entrance into the case. These actions clearly manifest an intent 
to proceed to trial. 
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833 P.2dat360. 
In Chandler, these actions were sufficient to "clearly manifest an intent to proceed to 
trial." In Parkwest, where the court held that the defendant had not waived the right to 
arbitration, the court held that "parties seeking to enforce arbitration should ensure that the court, 
not just the opposing party, is informed that arbitration is desired." 40 P.3d at 609. The court 
noted that defendants, although participating in a few pretrial motions before filing their motion 
to compel arbitration, mentioned arbitration as on option several times, including in a letter 
directed to plaintiff; a motion to dismiss; and in a counterclaim. Id. at 610. The court paid 
particular attention to evidence suggesting that the defendants had always participated in the 
litigation (as opposed to arbitration) reluctantly. Id 
This case is factually much closer to Chandler than to Parkwest. Like the defendants in 
Chandler, defendants in the present action participated extensively in the litigation before filing 
their motion to compel arbitration. Defendants: filed an answer, filed a counterclaim, filed two 
separate motions to dismiss, held an attorney planning meeting, served discovery requests upon 
the plaintiff and obtained substantial information, responded to plaintiffs discovery requests, 
took part in conference calls, defended depositions, took depositions in Utah of persons who 
reside in Singapore, and finally filed a protective order relative to the production of their 
electronic documents. It is of particular interest that defendants did not file their motion to 
compel arbitration until May 21, 2004, over two years after the original complaint was filed. 
Unlike the defendants in Parkwest, defendants here only mentioned the arbitration clause once, 
in their original Answer to the complaint. Defendants never took any measures to "ensure" that 
the court knew of their desire to arbitrate this matter. 
Considering the facts set forth above, it is clear that defendants did not originally intend 
to have this matter arbitrated, but seriously contemplated it only after two years of litigation. 
Therefore, defendants fulfill the first requirement for waiver under binding Utah case law. 
3. Prejudice Would Occur if Defendants Were Allowed to Compel Plaintiff to 
Arbitrate. 
Because defendants greatly delayed their assertion of the arbitration provision, and 
because plaintiffs (and defendants) have incurred great expense in this litigation, granting 
defendants' motion to compel arbitration would create prejudice in this dispute. The Utah 
Supreme Court has identified three independent factors that each point toward prejudice: 
[T]here is a general agreement concerning the prejudicial nature 
of certain factual situations. Courts have recognized that prejudice 
can occur if (1) a party gains an advantage in arbitration through 
participation in pretrial procedures. Courts have also stated that 
prejudice exists when (2) the party seeking arbitration is attempting to 
forum-shop after "the judicial waters [have] ... been tested." In 
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addition, prejudice has been found in situations where (3) the party 
seeking arbitration allows the opposing party to undergo the types 
of expenses that arbitration is designed to alleviate, such as the 
expense of preparing to argue important pretrial motions or the 
expense of conducting discovery procedures that are not available 
in arbitration. 
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 (footnote and citations omitted; numbers added). 
In Chandler, the court found that granting the motion to compel arbitration would create 
prejudice because: the defendants participated in "extensive discovery" beyond that which would 
be allowed in arbitration, and because the plaintiffs underwent great expense in conducting 
discovery. Id3X361. 
In the present case, granting defendants motion to compel arbitration would clearly create 
prejudice. Like the defendants in Chandler, defendants in this action have participated in 
discovery far beyond that which would be allowed in arbitration. Also like Chandler, the 
plaintiff in this action has expended substantial resources while participating in pretrial motions 
and discovery. Because one of the major benefits of arbitration is to alleviate the costs which 
have already been incurred here, it would be prejudicial to force plaintiffs to arbitrate after two 
years of litigation. Finally, the two years of experience that defendants have had in this case, 
including significant motion practice, has effectively allowed them to test the judicial waters. 
Granting defendants' motion at this late stage would be no different than allowing them to forum 
shop. 
Because defendants have participated extensively in pretrial procedures and essentially 
tested the judicial waters, and because plaintiff has expended great resources in over two years of 
litigation, granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration would create prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
After two years of litigation in this case, defendants request that the court grant a motion 
to compel arbitration and stay this action. Although the original contract did have an arbitration 
clause, defendants have waived their right to that arbitration. Waiver is proper in this case 
because defendants showed no original intent to arbitrate their dispute with plaintiff. Also, 
granting defendants motion to compel arbitration would create prejudice in this case due to the 
extensive discovery, expenses, and testing of the judicial waters that has already occurred. 
This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court, denying defendants' Motion to 
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Compel Arbitration and Stay litigation, and no further Order shall be required. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2004. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 
Civil No. 020903521 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
Pursuant to the Attorney's Planning Meeting Report signed by counsel of record for the 
parties and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
1. INITIAL DISCLOSURE: The parties have exchanged or will exchange by July 
1, 2002 the information required by Rule 26(a)(1). 
2. DISCOVERY: The parties jointly propose to the court the following discovery 
plan: 
a. All factual discovery will be completed no later than January 31, 2003. 
b. Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to 
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on February 28, 2003. 
c. Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on March 28, 2003. The 
depositions of experts will be completed by April 30, 2003. 
d. The following discovery methods may be used: 
x Interrogatories (up to a maximum of 50) 
x Requests for Admission 
x Requests for Production of Documents 
x Oral Exam Deposition (up to a maximum of 15 for plaintiff and 15 
for defendants, no deposition lasting longer than two days) 
e. Supplementation under Utah Civ.P. 26(e) are due as set forth in the 
applicable rules. 
3. OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The cutoff date for joining additional parties is December 2, 2002. 
b. The cutoff date for amending pleadings is December 2, 2002. Specify 
(NOTE: Establishing cutoff dates for amending pleadings does not relieve 
counsel from the obligation to meet the requirement of Utah Civ.P. 15(a)) 
c. The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions is 
May 16,2003. 
d. Final lists of witnesses and exhibits pursuant to Utah Civ.P. 26(a)(3) are 
due 30 days before trial. 
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e. The parties will have 10 days after service of final lists of witnesses and 
exhibits to list objections under Rule 26(a)(3). * 
Dated this \ p day of&use, 2002. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
fHECO 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
^MJJUI (VUMU^JA Jr 
David M. Wahlquisi) 
James E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
W gc 
R. Stephen Marshall 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ASIA PTE LTD Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE INC Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No: 020903521 DC 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
Date: September 4, 2002 
Clerk: christef 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES E ELLSWORTH 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS 
Video 
Tape Number: 0 9 04 02 Tape Count: 1:32 
HEARING 
Defendant's motion to dismiss Count 6 denied, but court finds it 
is an alternative to the contract claim. Defendant's motion to 
dismiss Count 2 granted, but court gives leave of 3 0 days for 
Plaintiff to file amended complaint 
specifically setting forth with particularity those phrases 
purported to be faudulent. 
Dated this day of bs£ 2 0 ^ 
R0GE& :Ap4> I?fp$&S*^^crfy:,yS w 
Di s t r j /qt^Court •" Judge / 
Page 1 ( l a s t ) 4M 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
: REVISED CASE SCHEDULING 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
vs. : 
Civil No. 020903521 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a : 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, : Judge Roger A. Livingston 
Defendants. : 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Stipulation and Motion for 
Revised Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the existing case 
schedule only as follows: 
1. DISCOVERY: 
a. All factual discovery will be completed no later than May 30, 2003. 
b. Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to 
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on June 30, 2003. 
c. Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on July 31, 2003. The 
depositions of experts will be completed by August 29. 2003. 
OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions is 
September 16, 2003. 
Dated this / f 'day of Jap^ry, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
± 
J 
7%J>Cg>^ 
Honorable Roger jClivjngston 
District Judge 
'/J £ 
KJRTON & McCONKIE 
Wahlquist 
/ames E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM JOKES & PINEGAR 
R. StephenlMar^hall 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT INC, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No: 020903521 . 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Date: 06/02/2003 
Clerk: rhilder 
Plaintiff has submitted its Motion to Compel for decision. The 
court has reviewed the file and finds no response from defendants, 
but in plaintiffs' affidavit in support of request for attorney's 
fees, the court notes an entry dated April 22, 2003, for 1.9 hours, 
which includes "Follow up re: Defendants' response to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel," and several references to communication with 
counsel for defendants on this same topic. In light of the 
apparent continuiing communication between counsel, the court is 
unwilling to sign plaintiff's proposed Order at this time, but will 
consider doing so when counsel and the court^^p&^n June 11, 2 0 03, 
to consider the pending Motion to Dismiss. 
r S ^ ^ ^ 
)S^ RX..^ ''HILDER 
' V ^ / ^ ' S T H I C ^ ;•.*••.-•• 
Page 1 (last) 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
David M. Waalquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 32S-3600 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EM AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SM fUE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
SECOND REVISED CASE 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
Civil No. 020903521 
Judse Roger A. Livineston 
JAiUl 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Stipulation and Motion for Second 
Revised Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the cxistmg case 
schedule only as follows: 
1. DISCOVERY: 
a. All factual discovery will be completed no later than September 30, 2003. 
b. Reports under Ride 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to 
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on October 31, 2003. 
ID 
c. Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on November 28, 2003. The 
depositions of experts will be completed by December 31, 2003. 
2. OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions wil 
be January 16,2004. 
Dated this J '"day of /K&^ ,
 2003. 
BY THE 
Hon6r\ 
District 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
KIRTON & 
Dsfvid M. Wahlquist 
a ames E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
fe£l 
RV Stephen MarlHaJl 
David W. Tuf 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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FILED DISTRICT SOSIRT 
Third •Jii'c'icis! District 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
JUL 2 l,m 
SALT LAKE vC-
By-
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., et al, 
Defendants. 
ORDER RE: AWARD OF EXPENSES 
FOR MOTION TO COMPEL 
Civil No. 020903521 
Judge Robert Hilder 
Pursuant to the June 11, 2003 hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and For Sanctions, 
arguments of counsel, the Court's ruling thereon, Affidavit of Attorneys Fees, Supplemental 
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees, other submissions of the parties, and good cause appearing, 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS Defendants to pay to Plaintiff within trn (10) days of tho 
fhtp, of this Q H W thft amount of $ / 3 JO . as expenses awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Fgr Sanctions. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this -day of 
17 T 
_, 2003. 
BY THE 
Htffiorabie Robert 
District Court Judgi 
o-\<? 
"^SSftg-r KIRTON & McCONKIE David M. Wahlquist (3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (5466) 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)415-3000 
Attorneys for defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore STIPULATION GOVERNING THE 
DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL AND 
Plaintiff, 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AND 
[m&$%m&\ ORDER THEREON 
Case No. 020903521 
Judge Hilder 
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Plaintiff and Defendants hereby stipulate and agree that the following provisions shall 
govern the disclosure of confidential and proprietary information in this action: 
1. As used herein, "Restricted Information" shall mean information which is not 
otherwise available to the public and which, in the reasonable and good faith belief of the 
designating party, discloses a trade secret or other confidential research, development, 
manufacturing, financial or commercial information, including licensing information, of the 
designating party, which justice requires be protected from disclosure. "Designating Party" 
means the party who designates documents, discovery responses or testimony as Restricted 
Information under this Stipulation and Order. 
2. Any party may designate documents and discovery responses it produced in this 
case as Restricted Information by stamping it "Restricted Information" as provided in paragraph 
10 herein. All copies, summaries or descriptions of the Restricted Information shall be treated as 
Restricted Information which is subject to this Stipulation and Order. 
3. Except as otherwise may be provided by this Stipulation and Order, or by further 
order of the Court, access to Restricted Information shall be limited to: (a) the Court and its 
officers; (b) designated witnesses (as provided in paragraph 8 herein), court reporters at 
depositions, hearings or other proceedings in this action; (c) attorneys of record in this action, 
including the secretarial, legal assistants and office staffs of such attorneys; (d) persons engaged 
by attorneys of record in this action to assist them in the preparation of this action, including 
independent experts and consultants and their employees; and (e) the parties to this action, their 
officers, directors and employees, and persons engaged by the parties to assist them in the 
preparation of this action, including independent experts and consultants and their employees 
(collectively, the "Approved Persons"). Approved Persons having access to Restricted 
Information shall not disclose such information to any person not bound by this Stipulation and 
Order. 
4. In the event that a Designating Party, in the reasonable and good faith belief that 
justice requires it, deems it necessary to deny access to specified Restricted Information to those 
persons described above in paragraph 3(e), such information may be designated "Restricted 
Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only." Where information is designated "Restricted 
Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only," the attorneys of record for the parties shall deny such 
information to those persons described above in paragraph 3(e), unless the Designating Party 
discloses the information to those persons at depositions, hearings or other proceedings in this 
action. The Designating Party is the only party authorized to disclose information designated 
"Restricted Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only" to the persons described in paragraph 3(e). 
5. Hereafter, the term "Restricted Information" shall include and refer to both 
information designated as "Restricted Information" and information designated as "Restricted 
Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only." 
6. A party's designation of documents, testimony, or other information as Restricted 
Information and/or a party's objection to disclosure of designated Restricted Information is not 
absolute but may be challenged and determined by the Court. 
7. Restricted Information shall be used and disclosed by the parties to this litigation, 
and/or by any person granted access thereto under this Stipulation and Order, only for the 
preparation and trial of this action. No party and no person granted access under this Stipulation 
and Order shall disclose Restricted Information, or any information therefrom, except as 
provided in this Stipulation and Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Stipulation and 
Order does not restrict the right of the Designating Party to make such use or disclosure of its 
3 ^ n 
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own documents or material which have been designated as Restricted Information as it otherwise 
is entitled to make. 
8. Any person described in paragraphs 3(b), 3(d) and 3(e) herein, having access to 
Restricted Information shall be informed of this Stipulation and Order and shall agree in writing 
to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Order by executing a copy of Exhibit A (which 
shall be maintained by the attorneys of record in this action) prior to being shown Restricted 
Information. Counsel for the parties to this Stipulation and Order shall each maintain a list of the 
Approved Person(s) who provide to counsel an executed copy of Exhibit A. 
9. Any party seeking to disclose Restricted Information to any witness at a 
deposition, hearing or other proceeding in this action, shall inform the party who made the 
designation at least five (5) court days prior to making such disclosure and no disclosure shall be 
made if the party who made the designation objects thereto. If there is no objection, the witness 
shall agree in writing to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Order by executing a copy 
of Exhibit A (which shall be maintained by the attorneys of record for the party seeking to reveal 
the Restricted Information to the witness) in advance of being shown the Restricted Information. 
The parties or their respective counsel shall request all witnesses to whom they seek to show 
Restricted Information to execute a copy of Exhibit A. Neither the parties nor their counsel shall 
discourage any witness from signing a copy of Exhibit A. If a party objects to disclosure of 
Restricted Information to a witness who has signed Exhibit A, Restricted Information may not be 
disclosed to such witness unless ordered by the Court upon a motion. Upon the sending of a 
written objection, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith regarding such objection. If the 
parties cannot agree and a motion is filed to allow disclosure of Restricted Information to a 
witness, the party objecting to disclosure to the witness (who signed Exhibit A) shall bear the 
4 
burden of proving that the witness should not be allowed to receive Restricted Information. 
10. An Approved Person may disclose Restricted Information in response to a 
subpoena or order of a court or other governmental entity, but not prior to the return date or date 
of production specified in the subpoena or order. The Approved Person shall give written notice 
of such subpoena or order within five calendar (5) days of receipt thereof to the Designating 
Party. Such Approved Person may produce Restricted Information in compliance with the 
subpoena or order unless the Approved Person has been given timely advance notice that an 
order quashing or limiting the subpoena or staying or limiting the order of disclosure has been 
entered or that a motion for such an order has been filed. 
11. In the production of documents or responses to discovery by any party hereto, 
Restricted Information shall be designated by marking each document in which such Restricted 
Information is contained. Such marking shall be made prior to the transmission of a physical 
copy of such document to the party requesting such document, and shall be in substantially the 
following form: 
"RESTRICTED INFORMATION 
SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. 020903521" 
or 
"RESTRICTED INFORMATION/ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY 
SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Civil No. 020903521" 
The foregoing designation shall be applied to the document. 
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12. In connection with the taking of any deposition in this action: 
a. Counsel for any party hereto may, prior to or at the commencement of any 
such deposition, temporarily designate the entire deposition transcript as Restricted Information. 
In that event, the Designating Party shall give a copy of this Stipulation and Order to the court 
reporter reporting the deposition and shall request that such reporter execute a copy of Exhibit A, 
which shall constitute an agreement that he or she, his or her employees, and his or her agents 
shall be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Order, and shall make no use or disclosure of 
Restricted Information unless expressly permitted by the terms of this Stipulation and Order, or 
by the express consent of the Designating Party. Such acknowledgment thereafter shall remain 
in effect for any subsequent depositions reported by such reporter. 
b. When any party has designated temporarily the entire deposition transcript 
as Restricted Information, the designation will be deemed withdrawn unless the Designating 
Party, within twenty-five (25) days after receipt of the transcript, marks as Restricted Information 
those specific pages of the transcript constituting Restricted Information, thus rescinding the 
Restricted Information designation of all remaining pages, and notifies all other parties hereto 
and the reporter in writing which pages are deemed to constitute Restricted Information. 
13. All Restricted Information filed with the Court shall be filed or lodged in securely 
sealed envelopes or other appropriately sealed containers, on which shall be endorsed: 
a. the title of this action; 
b. an indication of the nature of the contents; 
c. the words "RESTRICTED INFORMATION"; and 
d. a statement substantially in the following form: "Subject to Protective 
Order. Not to be Opened or the Contents Revealed Except (1) to the Court and Then Resealed, 
6 
(2) by Written Agreement of the Parties, or (3) by Order of This Court." 
14. Any party to this action may at any time notify the other parties hereto in writing 
of its objection that a portion or all of the information previously designated as Restricted 
Information is not entitled to such protection under the terms of this Stipulation and Order. Upon 
the sending of such'written notice, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith regarding such 
designation. The parties can agree during the meet and confer process, or at any other time, to 
partially de-designate information so it may be disclosed to persons other than Approved 
Persons. If the parties cannot agree, the party challenging the designation shall be the moving 
party of record if any motion is filed to de-designate the information. The designating party shall 
bear the burden in such motion of proving that the information was properly designated. 
15. All Restricted Information produced pursuant to this Stipulation and Order shall 
be maintained with all reasonable measures being taken by the party with custody of such 
Restricted Information to ensure the confidentiality of such information in accordance with the 
terms of this Stipulation and Order. 
16. If a party to this Stipulation and Order (or its counsel) becomes aware that it has 
disclosed Restricted Information to other than an Approved Person, such party (or its counsel) 
shall immediately inform counsel for the party whose Restricted Information has thus been 
disclosed of all relevant information concerning the nature and circumstances of such disclosure, 
and such party shall promptly take all reasonable measures to prevent further or greater 
unauthorized disclosure of the Restricted Information. 
17. If a party discovers that it inadvertently has produced information which is not 
designated as Restricted Information but which it intended to have so designated, and such 
failure to designate was the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, the party may 
7 
make such designation after the fact so long as it does so within a reasonable time after the 
disclosure. 
18. If information subject to a claim of attorney-client privilege or attorney work 
product is nevertheless inadvertently disclosed to another party, such disclosure shall in no way 
prejudice or otherwise constitute a waiver of, or estoppel as to, any claim of attorney-client 
privilege or attorney work product to which the disclosing party or other person would otherwise 
be entitled. If a claim of inadvertent disclosure is made, pursuant to this paragraph, with respect 
to information then in the custody of another party, such party shall promptly return to the 
claiming party or person that material as to which the claim of inadvertent disclosure has been 
made. The party returning such material then may move the Court for an order compelling 
production of the material. 
19. Upon final termination of this action, counsel for each party shall inform opposing 
counsel as to the desired disposition of Restricted Information in the possession of the other party 
(and/or its counsel). The Restricted Information, except for that incorporated in the work product 
of counsel for parties to this action, shall either be assembled and returned to the Designating 
Party or destroyed, according to the desires of the Designating Party, within sixty (60) calendar 
days of the final termination of this action. Notwithstanding, counsel may retain a copy of the 
Restricted Information in its file. 
20. The Designating Party may request that the clerk of the Court return to the party 
that filed them all documents that have been filed or lodged with the Court and have been sealed 
as confidential pursuant to this Stipulation and Order. If such documents cannot be returned by 
the clerk, the Designating Party may request that the clerk maintain in perpetuity, under seal, all 
papers filed under seal with the Court. 
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21. This Stipulation and Order shall be without prejudice to the right of any party to 
challenge the propriety of discovery on other grounds, and nothing contained herein shall be 
construed as a waiver of any applicable privilege, nor of any objection that might be raised as to 
the admissibility at trial of any evidentiary material. The parties reserve all rights to apply to the 
Court for an ordei modifying this Stipulation and Order or seeking further protection on this or 
other issues, and this Stipulation and Order shall not be construed to preclude a party from 
applying for or obtaining such further protection. 
22. Except as specifically provided herein, the terms, conditions and limitations of 
this Stipulation and Order shall survive the termination of this action, and the Court shall retain 
jurisdiction with respect to this Stipulation and Order following termination of this action. 
23. No part of the terms, conditions or limitations imposed by this Stipulation and 
Order may be modified or terminated except by (a) written stipulation executed by counsel of 
record for each party hereto and/or (b) order of the Court. 
IT IS SO STIPULATED: 
DATE: July J^_, 2003 
DtJRHAM fd^^TfJNEGAR 
R. Stephen Marshall 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATE: July / / ,2003 
KiRTON & McCONKIE 
^/David M. Wahlquist 
James E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
9 
ORDER 
The Court having reviewed the foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that such Stipulation shall be and is the Ord.et.of this Court. 
DATED: <M. # . / i± <zz>l>x? S 
s^k&tCsS 
Judge Hilcfe\ % ^ " ^ ^ f 
District Couri^g&r;^ 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
: CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 020903521 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a : 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., : Judge Robert Hilder 
a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Joint Motionfor Revised 
Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the existing case schedule only 
as follows: 
1. DISCOVERY: 
a. All factual discovery will be completed no later than January 30, 2004. 
b. Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to 
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on February 27, 2004. 
2y 
c. Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on March 31, 2004. The 
depositions of experts will be completed by April 30, 2004. 
2. OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions will 
be May 28, 2004. 
Dated this / / dayo 
(/ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
i^L _, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
Horto/atfte Ro' 
District Judge 
KTRTON 
/David M. Wahlquist 
James E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM JONES & PTNEGAR 
FCTStephen M^rs^all 
David W. Tufts 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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-*vj\ 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD. 
: ORDER OF THE COURT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 020903521 
BmESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., era/, : Judge Hilda: 
Defendants. : 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court on (1) Defendants' Second Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action for fraudulent inducement as well as on (2) Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel and For Sanctions. Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed by Defendants 
and by Plaintiff. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and For Sanctions was unopposed by any written 
submissions of Defendants but was disputed at oral argument. 
Based upon the briefing and oral arguments of counsel, applicable rules and case law, and 
for good cause appearing, THE COURT ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss is denied. Plaintiffs allegations meet the 
minimum pleading threshold. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is granted to the following extent: 
a. Defendants are to make documents responsive to Plaintiffs pending Requests for 
Production of Documents immediately available to Plaintiff for inspection and copying. 
Defendants should also provide Plaintiff with a written response to the Requests for 
Production of Documents no later than June 25, 2003. 
b. Defendants are to provide to Plaintiff appropriate responses to Plaintiff s pending 
Interrogatories no later than June 25, 2003. 
c. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby granted an award of expenses relative to its 
Motion to Compel and For Sanctions in an amount to be determined by the Court. Plaintiff 
is to provide a supplemental affidavit of expenses to the Court within ten days. Within ten 
days of Plaintiffs submission of a supplemental affidavit of expenses, Defendants may 
submit an opposition to the Court setting forth any contest as to the amount of expenses 
asserted by Plaintiff (but not disputing the underlying entitlement of Plaintiff to an award of 
expenses). 
d. Defendants initial answers to Plaintiffs Requests for Admission numbers 1,2,11, 
12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 28, and 29 were denials by Defendants and timely made. Defendant's 
proposed Amended Answers to Plaintiffs Requests for Admission are allowed and deemed 
amended only insofar as those proposed Amended Answers are admissions by Defendants. 
2 
3. The current case schedule of this matter will need to be redone to accommodate for the 
delays in complying with the outstanding discovery requests and in addressing Plaintiffs Motion 
to Compel and For Sanctions. The parties will work together to submit a revised case schedule to 
the Court. 
IT IS SO'ORDERED. 
DATED thi f^avof ^ u2—* ,2003. 
BYTHECQLJRT 
Honorab 
District Ju< 
Approved as to form: 
DURHAM JONES & PINEG 
J6 Stepheri Mkrshair 
David W. Tuft: 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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mm %mmi COURT 
Third l"<-"~:~: District 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801)328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
SECOND ORDER OF THE COURT 
REGARDING DEFENDANTS' 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Case No. 020903521 
Judge Robert Hilder 
This matter came before the Court via an unscheduled telephone conference requested by 
James E. Ellsworth, attorney for the Plaintiff, on Friday, July 12, 2003. On June 11, 2003, the 
Court issued an order which provided, in part, as follows: 
2(a) Defendants are to make documents responsive to Plaintiffs 
pending Requests for Production of documents immediately 
available to Plaintiff for inspection and copying. Defendants 
should also provide Plaintiff with a written response to the 
Requests for Production of Documents no later than June 25, 2003. 
AUG j) 12003 
SALT LAKE. COUNTY 
Sy-t-u......*—. 
Deputy Clerk 
l 
On June 18, 2003, Defendants produced over 5,000 pages of documents to Plaintiff at the 
offices of Defendants' counsel. On June 24, 2003, Defendants hand-delivered a copy of 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Production of Document to 
Plaintiffs counsel. In Defendants' written responses, Defendants state that they will provide 
documents responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests no. 11, 12, 14 and 15 at Defendants' 
facility in Walnut Creek, California, as those documents are maintained in their ordinary course. 
Specifically, Defendants stated that they have already produced documents in response to 
requests no. 11 and 12 at the meeting held on June 18, 2003, and that they would produce the 
remaining documents responsive to requests no. 11 and 12, as well as all documents responsive 
to requests no. 14 and 15 cuirently in Defendants' possession, custody or control at Defendants' 
facility in Walnut Creek, California. Defendants have further represented to Plaintiff and to the 
Court that Defendants are currently in the process of moving their warehouse of documents to a 
different warehouse, and this move will take four to five weeks, and that because of this move 
Defendants are physically unable to make the documents responsive to the above-referenced 
requests available for Plaintiffs inspection until August 15, 2003, at the earliest. Based on these 
representations of Defendants' counsel to the Court, the Court orders as follows: 
1. Defendants shall produce all documents responsive to Plaintiffs Requests for 
Production of Documents Nos. 11, 12, 14, and 15 that have not already been produced at 
Defendants' Walnut Creek California facility commencing on August 18, 2003 and continuing 
thereafter until Plaintiffs have had a reasonable opportunity to complete their inspection and/or 
copying. 
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2. In the event that the Plaintiff discovers evidence that the above-stated 
representations made by Defendants to the Court relative to Defendants' warehouse move and/or 
Defendants' inability to immediately produce the above-referenced documents are not accurate, 
Plaintiff may submit a motion to the Court seeking an appropriate sanction against Defendants. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. A 
Dated this 7 "day of 1 ^ 2 0 0 3 . 
BY THE OQU^':^.;'.;•:;.\ 
•J 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Durham Jones & Pinegar 
Honorable Rob'e^Hilder 
District Judge 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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KIRTON & McCONKIE 
David M. Wahlquist (3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (5466) 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
David W. Tufts (8736) 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)415-3000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, j 
vs. 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Counterclaim Defendants. _ _[ 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PATIENT 
RECORDS 
Case No. 020903521 
Judge Hilder 
HIED B88TBJST C 
Third Judicial Distort 
FES 0*i -20M I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY VA 
By — ——*—' ^Deputy Clerk 
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Having reviewed the submission of the Plaintiff and Defendants relative to Plaintiffs 
patient records, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
Plaintiff is directed to produce to counsel for Defendants the Plaintiffs patient records 
identified as document numbers SMILE2001 -SMILE3063. This production of Plaintiff s 
patient records is to be within the confines of the existing Order of the Court regarding 
confidentially. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this d^_ day ^^MJ^^My , 2004. 
(J 
BY THE COURT 
Jti&gjS riild 
Stipulated as to the form of this Order. 
KIRTON &McCONKIE DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
jXvid M. Wahlquist 
^James E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
L Stephen Mar3haIT" R.  
David W. Tufts ' 
Attorneys for Defendants 
#726576.1 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
K1RTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0 320 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
•ILE0 DISTRICT G0UR1 
Third Judicial: Qigtf^ ct 
•J (. 
By= 
MAR 1.0-20M;fti 
SALT LAKE COUNTY < 
• Xmpv^otk' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 
Civil No. 020903521 
Judge Robert Hilder 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Joint Motion for Further Revised 
Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the existing case schedule only 
as follows: 
1. DISCOVERY: 
a. All factual discovery will be completed no later than August 31, 2004. 
b. Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to 
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on September 30, 2004. 
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c. Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on November 305 2004. The 
depositions of experts will be completed by December 31, 2004. 
2. OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions will 
be January 31, 2005. 
Dated this f* day of/^^<C 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
m9 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
Ffoiforable Robert M l d ^ » . . ^ 
District Judge 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
/David M. Wahlquist 
f James E. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
R. Stephen"Mai^hall 
David W. Tufts 
Erik A. Olson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
? 
i i t i l BISTRiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUTO 1 1 ^ 
SALT LAKF COUNT 
By. 
David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
REGARDING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL 
Civil No. 020903521 
Judge Robert Hilder 
This matter came before the Court on (1) Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and 
(2) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. These motions were fully briefed by Defendants and by 
Plaintiff. The Court heard oral argument on these motions on June 14, 2004. 
Based upon the briefing and oral arguments of counsel, applicable rules and case law, and 
for good cause appearing, THE COURT ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is denied. 
l ~ ^ " \ 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is granted as follows: 
a. Based on the stipulation of the Defendants, the Court hereby orders that all 
documents which have been produced by either of the Defendants to Plaintiff in this 
litigation are true, correct, and authentic copies kept by Defendants in the ordinary course 
of their business. 
b. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff by July 14, 2004, all e-mail documents 
for a five year period from 1996 through 2001 that are responsive to the categories 
addressed in Plaintiffs pending requests for production of Documents. Defendants shall 
provide a log identifying all responsive documents to which a privilege is claimed. 
c. Plaintiff is entitled to receive an electronic copy of Defendants' accounting 
data documents and/or operating software if it is technically feasible to provide such a 
copy. On or before July 4, 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants are to have their respective 
technical personnel confer, with or without counsel, via telephone or in person, to 
determine whether the electronic documents and/or applicable software of Defendants 
used to access that data can be copied for use by Plaintiff solely for purposes of this 
litigation. To whatever extent Defendants documents maintained electronically and/or 
software relative thereto can be copied, those documents and software should be 
promptly copied and provided to Plaintiff. If any portion of Defendants electronic 
documents cannot be copied for delivery to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff and/or Defendants 
may request a further hearing before the Court to address these document production 
issues. If Defendants' are precluded by a software license or some other technical 
restriction from copying the software for use by Plaintiff solely in connection with this 
litigation, then Plaintiff and/or Defendant may request a further hearing before the Court 
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to address this issue. The Court expressly finds that Plaintiff is not limited to giving 
queries to Defendants to have Defendants run those queries on Defendants' computer 
system and provide Plaintiff with responsive print outs. 
d. The Court expects both parties to cooperate in good faith. Should issues arise 
concerning compliance with this Order or some other related issue, the Court invites the 
parties to raise those issues with the Court so that the Court can rule upon them. 
e. The Court reserves the issue of an award of costs and attorney fees relative to 
these motions until the Court has been able to explore the true degree of difficulty for 
Defendants to produce the electronic documents. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ^ V d a y o f L ^ V , 2004. 
BY THE-COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
David W. Tufts 
Attorneys for Defendants 
/A* 
^onoiable RoberrTIiidefe;£5Py / 
District Judge 
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349) 
James E. Ellsworth (#5466) 
KJRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore 
limited liability company, : JULY 13,2004 ORDER 
Plaintiff, : OF THE COURT 
vs. : 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a : Civil No. 020903521 
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., : 
a Utah corporation, : Judge Robert Hilder 
Defendants. : 
This matter came before the Court on July 13, 2004, pursuant to Defendants' Report and 
Request for Further Court Intervention Concerning Production of Electronic Data. Mr. Steve 
Gordon and Mr. Chad Pomeroy appeared on behalf of Defendants. Mr. James Ellsworth 
appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Based upon the arguments of counsel, applicable rules and case law, and for good cause 
appearing, the Court ordered the following in furtherance of the Court's prior rulings relative to 
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel: 
1. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff in a readable form (in either electronic or hard 
copy), no later than August 31, 2004, all e-mails through December 31, 2001, that are responsive 
FILED BJSTB5CTC8UBT 
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to the categories addressed in all Plaintiffs requests for production of Documents. The cost of 
this production is to be borne by Defendants. 
2. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff an electronic copy of Defendants' accounting 
data documents by July 21, 2004, if possible, but no later than by July 31, 2004. Defendants are 
to produce those data documents to Plaintiff in SQL format. Defendants have represented that 
this copying of electronic accounting data documents as ordered is not difficult or expensive. 
The reasonable cost of copying Defendants5 accounting data documents is to be borne by 
Plaintiff. 
3. The Court understands that there may still be issues outstanding of accessibility of the 
electronic accounting data being produced by Defendants and accessing software relative thereto. 
Accordingly, after the referenced production has been made, the Court will seek to make itself 
available as necessary upon the subsequent request of Plaintiff or Defendants to address issues of 
accessing softwzire or other items relative to this document production. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this fe ' day o £ i ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 0 4 . 
BYTHEXOURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DURHAM JONES cSrpINEGAR 
honorable Robert Hilderi 
District Judge 
David W 
Chad Pomeroy 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SMILE INC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT INC, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
Case No: 020903521 
Judge: ROBERT K HILDER 
Date: 09/02/2004 
Clerk: rhilder 
Defendants' Motion to Determine Jurisdiction has been submitted to 
the court for decision. The parties have requested argument, but 
because the court has determined that its ability to address the 
issue is extremely limited, argument will only delay the process 
and the court now enters the following ORDER staying further 
proceedings in the trial court pending possible direction from the 
Utah Court of Appeals. The reason for this court's action is as 
follows: The court finds that there is substantial ambiguity in 
the status of defendants' appeal of the court's Order denying 
arbitration, and that this court lacks both the jurisdiction and 
the ability to resolve that ambiguity. That is, when this court 
denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration, defendants appealed. 
Because the Order does not dispose of all issues, and because no 
Rule 54(b) certification was sought or granted, and based on prior 
experience in the Central Florida case, 40 P.3d 599 (Ut. 2002), 
this court assumed that the appeal would, in fact, be a petition 
for interlocutory appeal. The court only learned today that 
defendants' appeal was taken pursuant to UCA 78 -31a-129, which 
appears to provide an appeal as of right. In the Central Florida 
case, this court denied a stay, but after the Utah Supreme Court 
granted leave to proceed with the appeal, 
proceedings in the trial court. Thus, it 
if the appeal is of right, and it appears 
apppellate track, rather than the interlocutory appeal 
this court must stay proceedings. It is possible that 
statute was not meant to provide such a result when the judgment is 
not final, but this court does not believe it has the jurisdiction 
to address that issue. Accordingly, the court grants the stay as 
indicated. Any further consideration of the issue must occur at 
the Court of Appeals, unless and until the matter is remanded to 
this court. This signed Minute Entry shall be the ORDER of the 
that Court also stayed 
seems to this court, that 
to be following the usual 
route, then 
the cited 
Page 1 
Case No: 020903521 
Date: Sep 02, 2004 
court and no further Order is required. 
Judge/ROBERT K 
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SMILE INC. ASIA PTE, LTD., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
VS 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL. 
Defendants-Appellants.. 
OCTOBER 20, 2004 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 020903521 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040614-CA 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
DATE PAGE 
FILED DOCUMENTS NUMBERS 
04-23-02 COMPLAINT 1-22 
05-30-02 ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 23-38 
05-30-02 MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT 39-41 
05-30-02 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 42-49 
06-04-02 REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 50-54 
06-14-02 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 55-63 
06-25-02 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS 64-70 
06-25-02 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 71-73 
07-05-02 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 74-75 
07-09-02 ATTORNEY PLANNING MEETING REPORT 76-79 
07-12-02 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 80-82 
07-12-02 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 83-84 
07-16-02 CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 85-88 
07-29-02 NOTICE OF HEARING 89-91 
08-14-02 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 92-93 
09-04-02 MINUTES MOTION TO DISMISS 94 
10-04-02 AMENDED COMPLAINT 95-120 
10-25-02 SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS AND REQUEST FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT 121-123 
10-25-02 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND 
MOTION TO DISMISS 124-129 
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SMILE INC. ASIA PTE5 LTD, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
VS 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL, 
Defendants - Appell ants.. 
OCTOBER 20, 2004 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 020903521 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040614-CA 
11-11-02 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 130-153 
11-22-02 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS 154-160 
02-03-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 161-163 
02-04-03 STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR REVISED SCHEDULING 
ORDER 164-165 
04-01-03 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 166-168 
02-19-03 REVISED CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 169-171 
04-24-03 NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT/MO TO DIS 172-173 
04-22-03 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 174-176 
04-31-03 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS 177-179 
04-31 -03 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR 
SANCTIONS 180-206 
06-02-03 MINUTE ENTRY 207-208 
04-29-03 STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR SECOND REVISED CASE 
SCHEDULING ORDER 209-210 
04-30-03 AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS FEES RE: MOTION TO 
COMPEL 211-215 
05-05-03 SECOND REVISED CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 216-217 
05-07-03 NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT/MO TO DISMISS 218-219 
06-11-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 220-221 
06-11 -03 AMENDED ANSWERS TO FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION 222-225 
06-11-03 PROPOSED ORDER OF THE COURT RE: PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS (UNSIGNED) 
WITH ATTACHED MINUTE ENTRY 226-229 
06-11-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 230-231 
06-11-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 232-233 
06-26-03 OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 234-258 
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SMILE INC. ASIA PTE, LTD., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
VS 
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., ET AL, 
Defendants-Appellants.. 
OCTOBER 20, 2004 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 020903521 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040614-CA 
06-24-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 259-306 
06-19-03 SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
RE: MOTION TO COMPEL 307-314 
07-01-03 REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS FEES 315-319 
07-01-03 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 320-322 
(NO DATE) FAX COVER SHEET 323 
07-22-03 ORDER RE: AWARD OF EXPENSES FOR MOTION TO 
COMPEL 324-326 
07-22-03 MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 327 
07-21-03 STIPULATION GOVERNING THE DISCLOSURE OF 
CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AND 
ORDER THEREON 328-339 
07-10-03 JOINT MOTION FOR REVISED CASE SCHEDULE 340-341 
07-11-03 CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 342-344 
06-23-03 ORDER OF THE COURT 345-347 
07-28-03 ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT 348-361 
08-07-03 SECOND ORDER OF THE COURT REGARDING 
DEFENDANTS' PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 362-364 
08-13-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 365-366 
09-12-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 367-368 
09-16-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 369-370 
10-15-03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 371-374 
02-04-04 ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCTION OF 
CERTAIN PATIENT RECORDS 375-376 
03-04-04 JOINT MOTION FOR FURTHER REVISED CASE SCHEDULE 377-378 
03-09-04 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 379-381 
03-09-04 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 382-398 
03-10-04 CASE SCHEDULING ORDER 399-400 
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OCTOBER 20, 2004 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO. 020903521 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 20040614-CA 
03-22-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF JOHN REED 401 
03-31-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID COX 402-406 
03-26-04 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 407-491 
03-26-04 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 492-493 
04-13-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF TAN SEK-HO ERNEST 
REX, VOLUME I AND TAN SEK-HO ERNEST REX 494-496 
04-19-04 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL 497-591 
04-13-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF GRACE CHONG-
TAN MO-AI, VOLUME I AND GRACE CHANGE-TAN 
MO-AI, VOLUME II 592-594 
04-28-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL A. 
WILLIAMS 595-597 
04-28-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY M. JONES 598 
05-03-04 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 599-673 
05-12-04 NOTICE TO SUBMIT 674-676 
05-24-04 MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY 
LITIGATION AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 677-679 
05-24-04 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
ARBITRATION AND STAY LITIGATION 680-685 
05-26-04 NOTICE OF ARG/MO TO COMPEL/45MIN 686-687 
06-07-04 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY LITIGATION 688-776 
06-28-04 RULING AND ORDER 777-783 
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INDEX 
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06-10-04 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
ARBITRATION AND STAY LITIGATION 784-817 
06-10-04 REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST 
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 818-820 
06-14-04 MINUTES ARGUMENT/MO TO COMPEL 821 -822 
06-24-04 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF TONY PILARO 823-825 
06-25-04 NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF PAUL DAWSON 826-828 
07-01-04 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 829-830 
07-07-04 PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
ORDER 831-845 
07-08-04 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR 
SANCTIONS 846-848 
07-08-04 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
AND FOR SANCTIONS 849-862 
07-08-04 EXHIBITS CITED IN BRITESMILE'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR 
SANCTIONS 863-1093 
07-09-04 DEFENDANTS' REPORT AND REQUEST FOR FURTHER 
COURT INTERVENTION CONCERNING PRODUCTION 
OF DISCOVERY ELECTRONIC DATA 1094-1119 
07-13-04 MINUTES ARGUMENT ON DISCOVERY 1120 
07-13-04 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO IDENTIFY LEOW KEE PENG AS 
A WITNESS OR TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO TAKE THE 
DEPOSITION OF LEOW KEE PENG AFTER THE CLOSE OF 
DISCOVERY 1121-1132 
07-13-04 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO 
IDENTIFY LEOW KEE PENG AS A WITNESS AND/OR 
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION OF 
LEOW KEE PENG AFTER THE CLOSE OF DISCOVERY 1133-1135 
07-16-04 NOTICE OF POSTING BOND 1136-1138 
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07-16-04 NOTICE OF APPEAL 1139-1141 
07-26-04 LETTER FROM SUPREME COURT 1142 
07-26-04 LETTER FROM COURT OF APPEALS 1143-1144 
07-27-04 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS 1145-1242 
07-29-04 DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
CONCERNING LEOW KEE PENG 1243-1248 
07-30-04 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1249-1250 
08-02-04 LETTER TO JUDGE HILDER DATED 7-30-04 1251-1252 
08-02-04 ORDER OF THE COURT REGARDING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 1253-1256 
08-02-04 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1257-1258 
08-04-04 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO COMPEL 1259-1271 
(NO DATE) ENVELOPE 1272 
08-04-04 REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 1273-1275 
08-10-04 PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM REGARDING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO 
IDENTIFY LEOW KEE PENG AS A WITNESS AND/OR 
TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION OF 
LEOW KEE PENG AFTER THE CLOSE OF DISCOVERY 1276-1281 
08-10-04 NOTICE TO SUBMIT AND REQUEST FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT 1282-1284 
08-11-04 JULY 13, 2004 ORDER OF THE COURT 1285-1287 
08-16-04 MOTION TO DETERMINE JURISDICTION 1288-1290 
08-16-04 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DETERMINE 
JURISDICTION 1291-1296 
08-20-04 NOTICE OF ARG/MO TO COMPEL/1 HOUR 1297-1298 
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08-30-04 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS AND THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 1299-1300 
08-30-04 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DETERMINE JURISDICTION 1301-1306 
09-02-04 MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 1307-1308 
09-02-04 MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER (COPY) 1309-1311 
09-02-04 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DETERMINE JURISDICTION 1312-1320 
09-02-04 REQUEST TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST 
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 1321-1323 
09-08-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF ANTHONY PILARO 1324 
09-08-04 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITION OF PAUL DAWSON 1325 
09-08-04 NOTICE OF FILING COMPLETED TRANSCRIPT 1326 
09-08-04 COPY COVER PAGE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS, MOTION TO COMPEL, JUNE 14, 2004 1327 
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78-3 la-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 58. 
and Award § 84. 
78-3la-3. Arbitrat ion agreement [Repealed effective May 
15, 2003]. 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to 
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing 
at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-3, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003. 
Cross-References. — Labor Commission to 
promote voluntary arbitration of labor dis-
putes, § 34A-M03. 
ANALYSIS 
Municipal corporations. 
Oral modification. 
Prerequisites. 
Unconscionability. 
—Procedural. 
—Substantive. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
Municipal corporations. 
Absent a statutory prohibition, a municipal 
corporation has the power to submit to arbitra-
tion any claim asserted by or against it. Lindon 
City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1981). 
Oral modification. 
Because standard principles of contract con-
struction allow parties to agree to modify a 
wntten contract by their conduct or oral agree-
ment, an unwritten agreement to modify the 
jurisdiction of an arbitrator was enforceable. 
Pacific Dev., L.C. v. Orton, 1999 UT App 217, 
982 P.2d 94. 
Prerequisites. 
Because this section provides that only a 
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion is valid and enforceable, an arbitration 
agreement must be written to be enforceable 
under § 78-3 la-4. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1998). 
Partnership, single partner may not submit 
to arbitration, § 48-1-6. 
Policy that work terms and conditions should 
result from voluntary agreement, § 34-20-1. 
Public transit district labor disputes, § 17A-
2-1032. 
Water disputes, informal arbitration by state 
engineer, § 73-2-16. 
Unconscionability. 
—Procedural. 
Where patient was given the physician-pa-
tient arbitration agreement to sign just min-
utes before her surgery without any opportu-
nity to discuss the terms of the agreement or 
the option of not signing it, the elements of 
procedural unconscionability surrounded the 
negotiation of this agreement. Sosa v. Paulos, 
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
— Substantive. 
The term in a physician-patient arbitration 
agreement, requiring the arbitration panel to 
be comprised of neutrally selected orthopedic 
surgeons, is not, when standing alone, "so one-
sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an 
innocent party" and constitute susbstantive un-
conscionability. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 
(Utah 1996). 
The term in a physician-patient arbitration 
agreement, requiring payment of costs by a 
patient who wins less than half the amount of 
damages sought in arbitration, is substantively 
unconscionable on its face, considering that 
under this term, the patient must pay the 
doctor's attorney's fees and costs, even in situ-
ations where the physician is determined to 
have committed malpractice. Sosa v. Paulos, 
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
Waiver. 
Waiver of a contractual right of arbitration 
must be based on both a finding of participation 
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ARBITRATION ACT [REPEALED EFF. MAY 15, 2003] 78-31a,4 
in litigation to a point inconsistent with the 
intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice; 
both prongs of this test turn on the facts of the 
individual case and, furthermore, consistent 
with policy considerations, any real detriment 
is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice. 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 R2d 
356 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 
909 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration 
and Award §§ 11 to 53. 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 7 to 57. 
A.L.R. —Attorney's submission of dispute to 
arbitration, or amendment of arbitration agree-
ment, without client's knowledge or consent, 48 
A.L.R.4th 127. 
Participation in arbitration proceedings as 
waiver to objections to arbitrabiHty under state 
law, 56 A.L.R.5th 757. 
Awarding attorneys' fees in connection with 
arbitration, 60 A.L.R.5th 669. 
78-3la-4. Court order to arbi t ra te [Repealed effective 
May 15, 2003]. 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised 
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the 
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and 
order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement 
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdic-
tion to hear motions to compel arbitration,, the motion shall be made to that 
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue. 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or 
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made 
in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the 
action or proceeding. 
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim 
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the 
claim have not been shown. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-4, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 225, § 1. 
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws 
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and 
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective 
May 15, 2003. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Arbitration agreement. 
Notice. 
Arbitration agreement. 
A provision in a professional agreement be-
tween employees and a school district creating 
a grievance procedure by which an employee 
could seek review of the employer's actions 
within the chain of command, ultimately reach-
ing the elected board of directors of the district, 
was not an agreement to submit a dispute to 
arbitration. Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 
892 P.2d 1063 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Because § 78-31a-3 provides that only a 
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitra-
tion is valid and enforceable, an arbitration 
agreement must be written to be enforceable 
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1998). 
Because parties to binding arbitration waive 
substantial rights to formal public adjudication 
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ANALYSIS whether the order is a final judgment or has 
otherwise been designated as final by the dis-
Apphcability. &&
 c o u r t ^ ^ {J.R.C.P. 54(b). Pledger v. 
Vacation without directing rearbitration. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572. 
Applicability. Vacation without directing rearbitration. 
Former section was procedural and would Order of court in arbitration case, setting 
therefore apply to an action in which the com- aside award and ordering new hearing without 
plaint was filed before the effective date of the order for resubmission but also affirmatively 
section but the appeal was filed after such date. ordering plaintiffs and interveners to present 
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v Dick Brady Sys., 731 their claims for damages to receiver of defen-
P.2d 475 (Utah 1986). dant corporation, was final and appealable or-
A party may seek review of any order denying der. Bivans v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power 
a motion to compel arbitration, regardless of Co., 53 Utah 601, 174 P. 1126 (1918). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration appeals from arbitration, 23 A.L.R.5th 801. 
and Award §§ 82, 145 Appealability of order staying or refusing to 
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S Arbitration §§ 161 to 163. stay, proceedings in federal district court pend-
AX.R. — Appealability of state court's order ing arbitration proceedings, 11 A.L.R Fed. 640. 
or decree compelling or refusing to compel Appealability of federal court order granting 
arbitration, 6 A.L.R.4th 652.
 o r denying stay of arbitration, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 
Uninsured and undennsured motorist cover- 234. 
age: enforceability of policy provision limiting 
78-31a-130. Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act [Effective May 15, 2003]. 
The provisions of this chapter governing the legal effect, validity, or 
enforceability of electronic records or signatures, and of contracts formed or 
performed with the use of such records or signatures conform to the require-
ments of Section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, and supersede, modify, and 
limit the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-130, enacted by merce Act, cited in this section, is 15 U.S.C.S. § 
L. 2002, ch. 326, § 30. 7002. 
Federal Law. — Section 102 of the Elec- Effective Dates. — Laws 2002, ch. 326, 
tronic Signatures in Global and National Com- § 34 makes the act effective on May 15, 2003. 
78-31a-131. Effect of chapter on pr ior agreements or pro-
ceedings [Effective May 15, 2003]. 
This act does not affect an action or proceeding commenced or right accrued 
before this chapter takes effect. Subject to Section 78-31a-104 of this chapter, 
an arbitration agreement made before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the 
arbitration act in force on the date the agreement was signed. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-131, enacted by Arbitration Act effective May 15, 2003. 
L. 2002, ch. 326, § 31. Effective Dates. — Laws 2002, ch. 326, 
Meaning of "this act." — Laws 2002, ch. § 34 makes the act effective on May 15, 2003. 
326 enacts this chapter to replace the Utah 
